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ABSTRACT
This study examines rural credit market characteristics and their
impacts on transactors in the Northeast of Brazil, as well as discusses
some related welfare aspects of formal lending systems. In the first
chapter credit market as well as institutional (formal) credit system
characteristics are presented, as an introduction to the analysis of the
credit market in a specific subregion of the State of Ceara, in the North-
east of Brazil, i.e., the Serra do Baturite Area.
In the second chapter, local information is gathered and presented
for the completion of the informational requirements on the subject.
In the third chapter a conceptual framework of analysis regarding
how individual borrowers as well as institutional and non-institutional
lenders are thought to behave, is shown.
In the fourth chapter behavioral hypotheses of institutional and
non-institutional transactors are tested. There, intermarket effects and
other characteristics are detected.
Finally, in the fifth chapter, a cost-benefit analysis of existing
institutional policies regarding credit allocation is presented and
alternative allocation schemes are suggested.
Thesis Supervisor: William C. Wheaton
Associate Professor in the Department of Economics,
and Urban Studies and Planning
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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INTRODUCTION
This is a case study of a small section of the rural credit market
in Brazil, specifically, the rural credit market of the Serra do Baturite
Area in the State of Ceara, in the Northeast. It has the double purpose
of examining specific market characteristics and consequences of such
characteristics on farmer behavior regarding borrowing, as well as some
welfare impacts, derived from the overlapping of an institutional lending
system on a spontaneous non-institutional one. Borrowing in this con-
text refers uniquely to temporary purchasing power (money) transfers.
The analysis is a disaggregated one, proper for the type of ques-
tions usually raised by micro policy makers, dealing with questions of
interpersonal income distribution, price effects, etc. By adopting this
type of approach specific features and nuances of the financing problem
were identified, chiefly when policy recommendations were at stake.
As is well known, credit, by definition, is an interpersonal affair
where specific individual characteristics of borrowers and lenders deter-
mine the type and size of a transaction. On the other hand, information
regarding both sides of the affair is not always available and more likely
not to be at all. Information regarding borrowers (farmers) may be
obtained through direct interviews, as they usually are; but on lenders,
chiefly private (individual), it is practically impossible given the lack
of a consistent set of information regarding the composition of the
lenders' universe. Not only farmers but any individual belonging to a
population is a potential lender. Nonetheless, the problem is not
insurmountable because credit markets have not the same characteristics
of ordinary good markets, which contributed to the original decision to
dissaggregate the analysis.
The first, empirical, issue, is to show the existence of market
interdependence, i.e., the interdependence of the institutional supply
and the non-institutional (informal) demand for funds. Alternatively,
the demand for funds in the non-institutional sub-market is affected
by the type of behavior of institutional lenders.
This concept is not only intuitive but has important consequences
for analytical purposes.
In a market in which part of an individual's financial demand may
be satisfied by a low price supply, it would become obvious that a borrower
would exhaust this cheaper source first, and afterwards return to a
more expensive one, if worthwhile.
If this source is controlled by any type of rationing mechanism,
it is this rationing process that is going to determine the type of
behavior of the borrower in the non-institutional (or alternative)
market. Therefore, when the non-institutional demand is analyzed, its
potential as an institutional borrower must be determined. In other words,
any potential borrower must be evaluated from an institutional point of
view.
Given that institutional loans are subsidized, i.e., borrowers
pay negative prices, two types of effects are observed, i.e., an income,
or wealth, effect and a price effect. Both are measured in this study
for specific individuals.
A second, and consequent, issue is the verification that non-
institutional rates of interest are actually shadow-prices to farmers,
given that market interdependency is shown to exist, and farmers prefer
to exhaust the institutional source first, meaning that non-institutional
quantities are always marginal and, therefore, non-institutional prices.
Given market interdependency, a consequence is that farmers'
marginal or shadow-prices are affected by institutional rationing schemes.
This has direct effect on the decision making process of farmers
regarding where to allocate their resources; and specific incentives
would induce them to allocate their funds in certain directions. There-
fore, credit should be coupled with other policy instruments. Credit
alone is not sufficiently powerful, unless circumstances generate the
appropriate environment.
A second issue dealt with in this study refers to the policy
question of who and how much credit should be granted by official lending
institutions.
Institutional credit systems are, usually, concerned and organized.
with distributing credit to farmers with the purpose of expanding output
levels. The feasibility of such programs is calculated on the basis of
the expected additional output generated by institutional loans.
Methodologically, and conceptually, this is obviously not correct given
that farmers are not only producers as such.
As will be shown, farmers' decision making process regarding loans
involves consumption and investment (in and outside the sector) activities,
as well. Their demand for funds is the outcome of this total process,
meaning that for production to be increased specific incentives must
exist; if not, it will be worthwhile to avoid roundabout methods for
increasing consumption.
In this study, benefits for granting institutional, cheaper-, loans
are derived from farmers' demand for credit schedules, which encompass all
types of user benefits. It will be shown that as farmers are absorbed
by an institutional system granting cheap loans, a considerable part of
their benefits are income transferences and only a small part refers to
price effects. These price effects are derived from a shift in their
non-institutional demand schedules, whose rates of interest are their
shadow-prices.
Finally, it is shown that concentration of loans generate lower
total benefits than deconcentrE.tion. This result refers to the net
benefits to farmers, excluding processing costs. Chapter V is totally
dedicated to the cost-benefit analysis of alternative credit programs.
There it is shown that if processing costs, i.e., costs of transferring
financial resources to farmers are proportionally low, or if inexpensive
methods are devised, a large quantity of farmers may be attended, and the
program is therefore still feasible.
Alternatively, if the distribution of loans is expensive, then
concentration of loans is the only feasible outcome. Therefore, process-
ing costs of lending are crucial in determining the feasibility of
deconcentrated -credit programs.
CHAPTER I
CREDIT MARKET CHARACTERISTICS AND THE INSTITUTIONAL CREDIT SYSTEM
The first chapter of this 3tudy as divided into three parts, i.e.,
a preliminary economic, background, description of Brazil and the North-
east; a description of the credit market and its main characteristics
and, finally, a description of the institutional, or formal, credit system.
Credit market characteristics are specified through an enumeration
of the type of lenders and borrowers, as well as the amounts of credit
transacted in the institutional and non-institutional segments of this
market.
The institutional credit system is, initially, presented through a
brief description of the institutional system's legal framework or
normative apparatus which guides institutional lender behavior. After-
wards the system is linked with the monetary system of the country, and,
finallyj the institutional lending performance regarding the "who" and
"how much" was lent in the past is shown in greater detail.
The purpose of this and the next chapter is to introduce the
reader to the following analytical parts of the study in a continuous
way, so that the dimension of the credit problem is fully grasped.
- Preliminary economic background
Until 1960, the agriculture sector in Brazil was the second most
important income generator in the economy, only being surpassed by the
service sector. It was always the major employment generator as well as
the major source of export earnings.
From 1960 onwards, the industrial sector grew rapidly, surpassing
agriculture in terms of income fcrmation. Several factors contributed to
this, based on the political decision to industrialize the country as an
option for economic development, it the expense of agriculture.
Table 1 shows the evolution of Brazil's Domestic Income composition
from 1939 to 1969.
TABLE 1 - Evolution of Brazil's Domestic Income Composition
from 1939 to 1969
1939 1949 1959 1969
Agriculture 28.5 30.5 27.6 21.5
Industry 18.8 20.0 21.5 25.5
Services 52.7 49.5 50.9 53.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Centro de Contas Nacionais, FGV
Meanwhile, Brazil's population more than doubled during the period,
while not so in the Northeastern Region, as may be seen in Table 2.
TABLE 2 - Population growth in Brazil and the Northeast,
from 1940 to 1970, in 1000 inhabitants
1940 1950 1960 1970
Northeast 14,434 17,973 22,429 27,871
Brazil 41,236 51,944 70,992 92,341
Source: FIBGE, Census Data
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From a spatial distribution point of view, domestic income figures
show that the Southeastern region was always the richest one on an
aggregate as well as per-capita basis, while the Northeastern :-egion being
the third largest on the aggregate was always the poorest on a per-
capita bas4 s. Historically, the share of the Northeastern region in
total income formation fell from, approximately, 17 percent to 14 percent
on the aggregate, as shown in Table 3. Absolute values are shown at the
bottom of the table, in thousand cruzeiros.
TABLE 3 - Percentage Distribution of Domestic Income, by
Region, for period 1939 to 1969
1939 1949 1959 1969
North 2.6 1.8 2.0 2.1
Northeast 16.7 14.4 14.4 13.8
Southeast 62.2 65.9 63.2 62.8
South 15.3 16.2 17.9 18.2
Center West 2.1 1.8 2.5 3.1
Brazil 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Brazil-
Absol. 39,564 195,859 1,614,038 103,682,662
Source: Centro de Contas Nacionais - FGV
Table 4 shows per-capita values taken as a proportion of the Brazil-
ian average. Absolute values are shown at the bottom of the table. As
may be seen, per capita income in the Northeast was always less than
half the average income of the country (equal to 100).
Table 5 shows that the agriculture sector was always the second
largest income generator in the Northeast, while Table 6 shows that it
was the most important employment source. Agriculture was responsible
TABLE 4 - Proportion of Regional Per-capita Income Compared to
Brazilian Average = 100, during the 1950-1969 period
1950 1960 1969
Source:
Centro de Contas
Nacionais, FGV
North 48.1 60.9 53.6
Northeast 42.4 46.9 45.4
Southeast 151.0 143.3 146.4
South 107.9 106.4 103.5
Center West 53.6 58.2 58.0
Brazil 100.0 100.0 100.0
Brazil-
Absol. 4.5 31.6 1129.5
TABLE 5 - Northeastern Domestic Income Composition in
Percentage Terms from 1939 to 1969
Sector 1939 1949 1959 1969
Agriculture 39.3 39.5 40.1 35.8
Industry 13.6 13.1 12.4 11.5
Services 47.1 47.4 47.5 52.7
Source: Centro do Contas Nacionais, FGV
TABLE 6 - Economically Active Population in the Northeast, by Sector
During 1940-1970, in Percentage Terms. Absolute values in
thousand inhabitants
1940 1950 1960 1970
Agriculture 75.6 73.8 68.2 62.6
Industry 7.4 8.3 9.0 10.6
Services 17.0 17.9 22.8 26.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Absolute 5,135 5,599 6,905 8,353
Source: FIBGE, Census Data
for three-quarters of total employment in 1940 and almost two-thirds
in 1970.
Within the agriculture sector, cropping was always the uost
important income generator, as shown in Table 7, followed by animal
ranching and extrativist activities. The share of income generated by
cropping increased from, approximately, half of total sector's income to
almost three-fourths, while the share of animal ranching fell from 38
percent to 24 percent, in the last 40 years.
TABLE 7 - Agriculture's Income Composition, by Type of Activity,
in Percentage Terms, from 1939 to 1969, in the Northeast
Activities 1939 1949 1959 1969
Cropping 54 65 69 71
Animal Ranching 38 24 23 24
Extrativism 8 11 7 5
Total Agric. 100 100 100 100
Source: Centro de Contas Nacionais - FGV
Table 8 shows that cotton, corn and beans are the most land con-
suming crops in the Northeast, while Table 9 shows that cotton, sugar
cane, beans and manioc generated the largest production values. Cotton
and sugar cane are commercial crops while beans, corn and manioc are
subsistence crops, indicating that a mixed type of farming is most common
in the region.
Table 10 shows that the cattle herd almost doubled in the Northeast,
and more than doubled in Brazil during the 1920-1970 period.
TABLE 8 - Size of Harvested area, by Crop, for the 1960-73 period
in the Northeast, in Percentage Terms. Absolute values
in 1000 of hectares
1965 1 970 1973
Cotton 27 28 29 27
Rice 6 7 8 7
Sugar Cane 7 6 6 7
Beans 12 13 12 14
Manioc 9 8 10 9
Corn 18 18 17 19
Other 21 20 18 15
Total 100 100 100 100
Absolute 7,249 9,493 10,070 11,637
Source: FIBGE, Annual Reports
TABLE 9 - Percentage Composition of Total Value of Production of the
Agriculture Sector, by type of crop, for the 1960-1973
period, in the Northeast. Absolute values in Cr$ million.
1960 1965 1970 1973
Cotton 23 19 12 17
Rice 5 6 5 4
Sugar Cane 11 16 16 12
Beans 9 11 9 15
Manioc 10 10 14 13
Corn 6 8 5 6
Other 36 30 39 33
Total 100 100 100 100
Absolute 92,8 .1,215.1 3,981.3 11,280.9
Source: FIBGE, Annual Reports
1960
TABLE 10 - Cattle Population in the Northeast and
from 1920 to 1970, in million animals
Northeast
Brazil
1920
7.4
34.3
1940
7.7
34.4
1950
9.7
44.6
1960
11.6
56.0
Brazil,
1970
13.4
78.5
Source: FIBGE, Census Data
Regarding ownership and land distribution patterns in the Northeast,
in 1975, Table 11 shows that the distribution of land is highly skewed.
Seventy percent of establishments (defined as being a productive unit
under a same management) occupied, approximately, five percent of land,
while one-tenth of a percent occupied more than the seventy percent.
TABLE 11 - Ownership and Land Distribution
Northeast of Brazil, in 1975
Patterns in the
0 - 10
No. 1,.656,324
Ha. 4,324 689
70
5.4
10 - 100
567,064
18,180,695
24.0
22.8
100 - 1000
130,850
33,163,859
1000 - 10000
8,996
18,615,443
0.4
23.3
> 10000
238
5,497,483
Source: FIBGE, Agricultureal Census
of 1975
5.5
41.6
0.1
6.9
- General Credit Market Characteristics
a) Type of lenders:
Lenders will be divided into two general groups, i.e., insti-
tutional and non-institutional. Institutional lenders will be defined as
those belonging to the National System of Rural Credit (SNCR), and non-
institutional lenders as those which do not.
The SNCR composes the complex of financial institutions which
execute the rural credit policy in the country, formulated by the Monetary
Council (CMN) according to defined monetary and agricultural policies.
The following are included as non-institutional lenders: farmers,
merchants, truckers, money lenders, friends, relatives.
b) Number of farmers attended and amounts lent:
The rural credit market in the Northeast of Brazil will be
divided into institutional and non-institutional, as defined above.
Institutional credit is granted in money terms and non-institutional
credit may also be granted in goods or merchandise, for later payment.
The purpose of this study is to concentrate on financial loans. As
will be shown, non-institutional lenders' share, in terms of number of
farmers attended and value, decreased sharply from 1965 onwards when
government decided to use rural credit as a form to stimulate the increase
of the sector's output.
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Estimates of the number of farmers (estabelecimentos) attended, as
well as volumes lent will be based on two different data sources:
- FIBGE (Fundacao Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica)
- BACEN (Banco Central do Brasil - the brazilian central bank)
FIBGE data on rural financing are based on Census information. Census
were realized in 1920, 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970 and 1975;.but rural financing
information was surveyed from 1960 onwards.
As shown below, 1960 information dealt only with the number of
estabelecimentos attended but not with amounts lent (values), by type of
source. Sources were divided into three groups: Public Entities, Private
Entities and Both. Figures shown were based on samples taken from Census
information and expanded for the universe. The unit of the universe is
the rural estabelecimento, defined by FIBGE as being a productive unit
under a same management. Therefore, a rural property may be divided into
several estabelecimentos according to management (owner, renter, share-
cropper,'occupant), or vice-versa, i.e., an owner of two nearby properties
will be considered as one estabelecimento. Nearbyness is extended to the
same municipality. Table 12 shows the total number of estabelecimentos,
the number of estabelecimentos which were granted financial loans and the
corresponding breakdown by source, in 1960. It may be seen that, approxi-
mately, 60 percent of total borrowers were attended by non-institutional
(private) sources, excluding double-source borrowers. The same percentage
applies to Brazil as a whole. The table also shows that 5 percent of
estabelecimentos get any kind of loan, a result that is slightly below the
national average.
TABLE 12 - Rural Credit Attendance by Private and Public
Institutions, in 1960
Attended
Number of Total by Public
Estabments Attended % Entities %
Total in 1,408,114 84,970 5.19 23,856 28.07
Region 3,337,769 275,159 8.25 82,573 30.00
Attended
by Private Attended
Instit. % by Both %
52,214 61.56 8,900 10.47
168,229 61.14 24,357 8.85
Source: FIBGE, 1960 Census
Table 13 shows 1970 Census information (estimates). FIBGE changed
their lender groupings into Individuals, Government and Private Entities;
Individuals referring to person-to-person loans; Government referring to
loans granted by official institutions (Federal and State); and Private
including loans from private bansk, cooperatives, firms, etc.
1970 data on financing was also based on census sample estimation.
Lenders' groupings do not add up because of double-source borrowers.
Table 14 shows total values lent, by type of source, state and for
the Northeastern Region, in 1970, as estimated by FIBGE. As shown in
the table, non-institutional loans corresponded to, approximately, 10
percent of total loans granted by any source in the Region. The State of
Ceara had the largest non-institutional share of money loans in the market,
while in Piaui only 2.6 percent of total resources came from non-institu-
TABLE 13 - Rural Credit Attendance by Individuals, Government
and Private Institutions, in 1970
Total
Number of
Establish.
Total
Attended
Attended by
% Individuals
Attended
by
% Government %
Region 2,179,787 107,410 4.93 72,980 67.95 72,980 67.95
Brazil 4,924,019 567,598 11.53 409,947 72.23 409,957 72.23
Source: FIBGE, 1970 Census AttendedPrivate
Inst. %
8,116 7.56
69,041 12.16
TABLE 14 - Loans, by Type of Source, by State, in 1970
Non-Institutional Institutional Total Loans
Loans Loans
State Cr$1000 % Cr$1000 % Cr$1000 %
Maranhao 2,631 9.6 24,809 90.4 27,440 100.0
Piaui 514 2.6 18,968 97.4 19,482 100.0
Ceara 8,534 15.0 48,520 85.0 57,054 100.0
R.G.N. 3,469 12.5 24,390 87.5 27,859 100.0
Paraiba 6,013 12.7 47,465 78.3 53,478 100.0
Pernamb. 14,490 13.8 90,494 86.2 104,984 100.0
Alagoas 3,302 6.3 49,483 93.7 52,785 100.0
Sergipe 1,779 5.2 32,321 94.8 34,100 100.0
Bahia 14,065 9.2 139,645 90.8 153,710 100.0
- Total 54,797 10.3 476,095 89.7 530,892 100.0
Source: FIBGE, 1970 Census
institutional sources. Pernambuco had the largest-volume of non-institu-
tional loans, and Bahia the largest volume of institutional loans.
Tables 15 and 16 present institutional and non-institutional loan
allocation by activity, in 1970, as estimated by FIBGE. As may be seen,
non-institutional loans are primarily for agriculture purposes while
institutional loans not so much. The reason for it is that small farmers
are the most significant borrowers in the non-institutional market while
this is no* so in the institutional market. Loans for animal production
are granted to larger farmers.
TABLE 15 Institutional Loan Allocation by Activity, in 1970,
in the Northeast
Agriculture
Number of Value in
Farmers Cr$1000
Animal Production Other
Number of Value in Number of Value in
Farmers Cr$1000 Farmers Cr$1000
54,074 232,741 17,285 167,228 9,734
66.7 48.9 21.3 35.1 12.0
76,126
16.0
Source: FIBGE, Census 1970
TABLE 16 - Non-Institutional Loan Allocation, by Activity,
in 1970, in the Northeast
Agriculture
Number of Value in
Farmers Cr$1000
25,183 33,163
85.1 60.5
Animal Production
Number of Value in
Farmers Cr$1000
2,439 13,026
8.2 23.8
Other
Number of Value in
Farmers Cr$1000
1,971 8,618
6.7 15.7
Source: FIBGE,
Total
Total
Census 1970
Tables 17 and 18 show how institutional and non-institutional loans
were allocated to investment, production, commercialization or other
purposes. As may be seen, depending on the source, a larger siare of
funds goes to investment. Institutional loans go primiarly to investment
while non-institutional go to production. The reason for this preference
comes from price and terms differences imposed by the alternative sources
for each type of loan. Institutional loans are subsidized while non-
institutional ones are not, and returns from borrowing are usually not
fully absorbed by farmers as such, mainly by the smaller ones given their
lack of commercialization and storaging facilities.
TABLE 17 - Institutional Loan Allocation, by Purpose, in 1970,
in the Northeast
Investment
Number Value
of in-.
Farmers Cr$1000
Total 27,816 192,263
% 34.3 40.4
Production
Number Value
of in
Farmers Cr$1000
37,561 151,905
46.3 31.9
Commerce
Number Value
of in
Farmers Cr$l000
3,748 20,364
4.6 4.3
Not Identified
Number Value
of in
Farmers Cr$1000
11,971 111,563
14.8 23.4
Source: FIBGE, Census 1970
TABLE 18 - Non-Institutional Loan Allocation, by
in the Northeast
Purpose, in 1970,
Investment
Number Value
of in
Farmers Cr$1000
Total 4,553 15,142
% 15.4 27.6
Production
Number Value
of in
Farmers Cr$1000
18,231 21,455
61.6 39.2
Commerce
Number Value
of in
Farmers Cr$1000
3,018 3,290
10.2 6.0
Not Identified
Number Value
of in
Farmers Cr$1000
3,791 14,911
12.8 27.2
Source: FIBGE, Census 1970
- The Institutional Credit System
A) The Legal Framework
General Dispositions
- Concepts and Objectives
Rural credit consists of supplying financial resources
through institutions forming the National System of Rural Credit (SNCR)
for the exclusive use indicated in the Rural Credit Manual.
The following are the objectives of rural credit:
a) to stimulate the orderly growth of rural investments, including
storaging,processing and handling of farm products, when per-
formed within farm limits, by farmer cooperatives or any other
person or enterprise considered as such;
b) to provide sufficient and timely resources for the financing
of farm production and marketing activities;
c) to promote the economic strengthening of producers, particularly
medium and small farmers;
d) to stimulate the use of rational production methods, aiming for
the increase in productivity and welfare of the rural popula-
tion, as well as of soil conservation and use.
The rural credit program has not the objective of generating invest-
ment opportunities to financial institutions, neither to substitute
farmers' capital which should participate in the program according to
their means.
It is not the purpose of rural credit to subsidize inefficient or
financially unsound activities, or to finance repayments of debts which
were contracted before the presentation of the loan proposal, to recover
invested capital, to favor speculative enterprise and to anticipate
expected profits.
The granting of credit is subordinated to the idoneousness of applicants;
budgeting of credit use by activity; opportunity, sufficiency and adequacy
of demanded resources; submittance of applicant to use and repayment
schedules previously accorded; and inspection, by financing agent, of use
of resources.
Rural credit transactions are subordinated to the norms specified
in the Rural Credit Manual, regardless of source of funds unless specific-
ally authorized by the National Monetary Council (CMN) or Central Bank (BC).
- The National System of Rural Credit (SNCR)
The system is divided into three types of institutions:
a) basic; including the Central Bank; the government owned bank
(Banco do Brasil); a regional bank (the government owned Banco
do Nordeste do Brasil) and the National Bank of Cooperative
Credit.
b) vinculated; including the National Institute for the Coloniza-
tion and Land Reform (INCRA); the National Bank for Economic
Development (BNDE); and auxiliary institutions such as State
Banks, Private Banks, Savings Banks, Rural Credit Cooperatives
and private financing agents.
c) articulated; including Regional Development institutions as well
as technical assistance entities, which services may be utilized
for comprehensive assistance programs.
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The control of SNCR, for all means, is a direct attribution of the
Central Bank and executed through its Bureau for the Coordination of Rural
and Industrial Credit (GECRI) which directs, coordinates and fiscalizes
all policies concerning rural credit emanated from the National Monetary
Council (CMN); coordinates the action of all financial agents in the
system; allocates resources and determines the adequatemeans of selection
and priority setting; is responsible for repassing of funds; stimulates
the increase in size of the distribution network of rural 'credit and is
responsible for SNCR's personnel training.
- Beneficiaries of the SNCR
The following are eligible for rural credit, loans: farmers,
individuals or firms; individuals or firms which, even if not classified
as farmers, be engaged in research or production of seeds and springs,
agricultural and soil conservation, mechanization services or in the
fishing industry.
Commercial firms or industries which buy farm products, as well as
middle-handlers, are not eligible.
Eligible candidates are classified as small, medium and large farmers
according to total yearly production value, and loans be proportional,
at maximum, to this total. All candidates must be cadastraled and appli-
cations for credit must follow specific rules including complete budgetings.
Projects and plans may also be submitted but subject to predetermined
forms.
- Guarantees
Guarantees on loans may be chosen among the following: fiducial
exclusions, aval, personal guarantee, mortgage, securities, commercial
securities and other, if accepted by the National Monetary Council.
The election of the specific type of claim is of free choice by the
interested parties, which must adjust the deal according to the nature and
terms of loans. Lenders may, at their choice, require free vinculated goods,
unless rights were transferred by endorsement or cession. Debtors are ob-
liged to reinforce or substitute their guarantees if loss, reduction, deter-
ioration or depreciation occurs. Financed or potentially financed crops
or goods may be included in the total value of collateral given as
guarantee. Collaterals may include third party values.
- Expenses
Financial resources lent through the SNCR are subject to the
following expenses: a) financial charges; b) financial operations tax;
c) service changes. These expenses may be capitalized as part of loans.
Improper charging of expenses are considered serious infractions and subject
to legal sanctions.
Financial charges are interest, commissions and monetary correction
(indexing) charges. Interest rates are determined by the National
Monetary Council. These charges are due twice a year - June 30 and
December 31, of each calendar year; at maturity of installments and at
maturity of loans. Financial agents are prohibited to anticipate any
collection of financial charges, which should be calculated by the
"Hamburger Method" [ cO] including over balance due, excluding commercial.
discount transactions.
When monetary correction charges are adjusted, the new rates should
incide over existing debt, as well. In case of delay of any payment due,
interest charges are increased by one percent. Loans up to 50 MVR (maxi-
mum reference values - a standard measuring unit being approximately
equal to a minimum salary) receive favored treatment regarding financial
charges. In case of subsidized production inputs (as defined) borrovwrs
will be paying a rate of 7 percent a year and the Central Bank 8 percent,
to financial agents.
Not all types of rural financial transactions are subject to the
financial operations tax, but only rural commercialization loans, discounts,
and pre-commercial loans, under specific circumstances.
Service charges may be collected for the following: a) technical
assistance costs, at farm; b) patrimonial valuation costs, at farm;
c) plan or project confection costs; d) auditing costs; e) inspection costs.
These charges cannot exceed 1 percent of loan value at opening of the
credit operation and 1 percent a year over balance due after first year
of loan. Technical assistance fees may be charged while the services
are rendered.
- Terms
Rural loans may be paid once or by installments, according to
production and harvesting cycles. Terms and repayment schedules will be
a function of the payment capacity of borrowers so that installment
schedules coincide with income generation schedules.
Operating loans due dates should be fixed at the time of harvest
plus 60 days, allowing for commercialization.
Payment of principal may be delayed as much as necessary according
to income, but limits are defined in each case.
- Use of Loans
Amounts lent may be drawn at once or in parcels according to
cash requirements generated by farm activities (acquisitions and services).
Parcels should correspond to, at least, a full month of expenses generated
by the farmer. Payment of farmer expenses should be made directly to
sellers of goods and services by submitting corresponding debt notes, when
sellers consist of registered firms. For acquisitions of less than 3 MVR,
or when the seller is not commercially registered, amounts may be paid
directly to the borrowers, who should submit corresponding receipts
within 30 days.
- Purposes of Loans
Loans may be granted for the following activities: a) production,
b) investments; c) commercialization.
Production loans are supposed to provide financial resources re-
quired for payment of productive activities in farms.
Investment loans are supposed to induce the acquisition of goods
whose services will be obtained for several production periods.
Commercialization loans are supposed to cover all or part of
expenses which occur after harvest, or to convert commercial titles or
claims into cash.
Loans may also be classified as a) current; b) educational; c)
special. Current loans are all those which do not include technical
assistance. Educational are all those which include technical assistance;
and special loans are those provided to cooperatives, colonization and
land reform programs.
- Resources
Rural credit operations may be financed by: a) agent's own
resources; b) specific allocations by government; c) special programs;
d) rediscount; e) refinancing or repassing by the Central Bank; f) special
Central Bank notations; g) resolutions, and other.
- Production loans
Production loans are classified as: a) agricultural; b) cattle
raising; c) processing. Agriculture loans are supposed to finance pro-
duction cycle expenses for periodic crops or maintenance expenses of per-
manent crops, as well as harvesting of spontaneous vegetable products,
processing and storaging at farm or cooperative.
Total loan values should not, in general, exceed 60 percent of
expected production value, considering average regional productivity and
minimum price values fixed by government, or equivalent market prices in
case of inexistence of minimum price values. Loans may be granted for a
maximum of two years and terms fixed as a function of harvesting plus
60 days.
Cattle-raising loans are supposed to finance cattle-raising
current expenses, as well as agriculture, fishing and sericiculture
current expenses.
Processing loans are supposed to finance product processing activi-
ties, such as labor, maintenance of equipment, purchase of materials,
handling, packaging, storaging, insurance, taxes, transportation and
correlated expenses; but only when more than 50 percent of goods to be
processed were produced at farms or belong to associates, in the case of
cooperatives. These loans may be granted separately or extensively as
part of agriculture or cattle-raising loans. Processing loans may be
granted for two years, at most, and deadlines should not surpass 180 days
after the last installment has been granted, unless technically required.
- Investment Loans
Investment loans aim at the formation of fixed capital, financing
the following activities: a) damming; b) purchase of long lasting (more
than 5 years) machinery and equipment; c) reform, construction and enlarge-
ment of fixed installations; d) land clearing and cleaning operations;
e) soil draining, protection and recuperation; f) electrification and
rural telephony; g) foresting and reforesting; h) permanent crop and
pasture formation; i) irrigation.
Investment loans also aim at the formation of semi-fixed capital,
financing the purchase of farm animals; purchase of machinery, equipment
implements and installations with less than 5 years average lifetime; as
well as the purchase of vehicles, boats and airplanes.
Mixed budgets, derived from integrated projects and including
production costs, should be considered as investment budgets for lending
purposes if there is predominance of fixed and semi-fixed investment costs.
Loan terms should not surpass 5 years in case of semifixed capital
formation and 12 years for fixed capital formation. Loans for land
cleaning or (and) clearing operations, fertilizing, soil liming, earth
removal and pasture restoration should not be longer than 5 years. Loans
for tractor, harvesting and other large size machinery purchase should
not surpass 8 years with two years (maximum) grace period.
- Commercialization Loans
Commercialization loans have the objective to assure the
necessary financial resources to producers and producer-cooperatives for
the selling of their goods at the right cime, in the market. They may
be classified as pre-commercialization loans, discounts and minimum-price
loans. Farm product buyers are not considered as eligible for these loans.
- Loans for Cooperatives
Loans may be granted to producer cooperatives for their operation
and growth as well as for their patrimonial consolidation. Cooperative
loans have the following purposes: a) advance payments for products
delivered but whose prices were not fixed; b) acquisitions of inputs for
later distribution to associates; c) revenue anticipation for services to
be rendered to associates; d) repass of financial resources to associates
for their normal production activities.
- Land Purchase Credits
Loans may be granted for colonization or settlement purposes
as well as land-reform projects, consistent with Law No. 4504 of November
30, 1964; for any other governmental program of the same nature; or for
purchases of land by individual farmers. Financed land must satisfy
minimum settlement requirements including transportation, storage,
input supply services, and technical assistance facilities. Colonization
enterprises will have priority on land-purchase loans when executive INCRA
projects or own projects approved by INCRA. Isolated land purchases may
be financed to: a) farmers who do not possess land and for areas purchased
that are not less than one and not more than three regional modules;
b) farmers who want to acquire contiguous land such that income generated
by production on new plots is sufficient for maintenance of reasonable
welfare standards; c) joint-owners who want to acquire remaining shares
under specific conditions.
B) Monetary Policy and Rural Credit
Government controls its monetary policy and objectives, basically
through the Monetary Budget. Monetary budgeting as a technique for
implementing monetary policy objectives at a given period was introduced
in Brazil in 1964 as a result of the government recognizing the need for
greater monetary controls given the desired levels of inflation defined
by the monetary authorities.
The monetary budget consists basically of a set of accounting
equations and behavioral parameters of public and commercial banks. It
uses explicitly a set of relations representing the link between the
Monetary Authorities' and Commercial Banks' accounts. The Monetary
Authorities' accounts are divided into assets (resource uses) and liabili-
ties (resource sources). Liabilities are divided into monetary and non-
monetary. Monetary liabilities are defined as the monetary base, which,
when multiplied by a parameter (the multiplier) become the Money Supply
(volume of the means of payment).
The monetary authorities in Brazil consist of the Central Bank and
the Banco do Brasil. The monetary council is responsible for the formula-
tion of the monetary policy and the Central Bank (BACEN) for its execution.
Until 1977, Banco do Brasil had the double role of being a Commercial
Bank and a monetary authority. As a monetary authority, Banco do Brasil
is the financial agent of the Treasury, an exclusive receiver of all
deposits made by federal agencies. a keeper of voluntary reserves from
Commercial Banks and an exclusive agent from the Central Bank.
Budget formation and control is Lxecuted by the Central Bank under
the supervision of the Monetary Council.
Rural Credit is also a part of the monetary budget and the sources
of resources which compound the rural credit institutional fund are
several. Table 19 shows the relative importance of each item composing
the resource side of the rural fund lent by the monetary system.
TABLE 19 - Relative Composition of the Rural Credit Fund,
1972 - 1977
Resources 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Resolutions 69 and 260 66.5 66.3 61.2 65.0 68.0 71.6
Funagri 8.1 8.5 8.3 14.0 22.0 19.3
Other 25.4 25.2 30.5 21.0 10.0 9.0
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: BACEN
As may be seen, Resolutions 69 and 260 are the most important
sources of funds for rural credit. Resolution 69 of the Central Bank
stated that Banks were obliged to allocate 10 percent of total deposits,
to the Rural 6ector. Afterwards, Resolution 260 expanded this pro-
portion to 15 percent of the deposits from the public in the banking
sector.
It may be shown that there is a direct link between the expansion
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the money supply and rural credit, generated by a feedback to the
monetary system, sustaining a monetary expansion. Anti-inflationary
policies implemented through the control of the money supply may af fect
the total amount available to the sector. Finally, it may be seen that
Resolutions 69 and 260 make the opportunity cost of resources to institu-
tional lenders almost zero because of the exclusiveness of its use.
Funagri, is a composition of several resource items, i.e., Treasury
contributions, external (international) loans, retention quotas from
exported products, etc.
C) Institutional lending performance
Institutional lending characteristics are best shown through
Central Bank (BACEN) information, on a time series starting in 1969 up
to 1976. This information is considerably detailed and will be shown
in the next seven tables. Values are ir constant, 1977, terms. BACEN,
do not present the number of farmers attended but only the number of
contracts signed. This number, in 1977, in the State of Ceara, ranged
from 1.1 to 1.5 per farmer, depending on the lending institution's
operational procedures.
Table 20 presents the number of contracts signed and amounts lent,
in the Northeastern region, and shows that the absolute number of con-
tracts signed doubled while the amount of loans more than quadrupled,
in real terms, from 1969 to 1976.
TABLE 20 - Number of contracts signed and amounts lent by the
Institutional System, in constant (1977) prices, in
Cr$1000, in the Northeast
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Contracts 142,478 132,928 207,397 203,131 198,493 212,178 254,374 280,818
Constant
(1977) 5,747 5,957 7,456 8,701 11,504 14,414 23,063 25,205
Value
(Cr$1000)
Source: BACEN, Yearly Rural Credit Reports
Tables 21 and 22 show that, approximately, 75 percent of contracts
and 63 percent of loans -- average for the period -- were made for
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agriculture activities and that the number of contracts signed for agricul-
ture loans (crop production and investments) doubled while values lent
quintupled. Contracts for animal raising loans almost doubled and values
lent quadrupled.
TABLE 21 - Number of Institutional Contracts Signed, by Type of
Activity, During the 1969-1976 period, in the Northeast
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Agri- T 99,495 102,714 164,683 156,422 148,653 158,265 181,353 208,597
culture 0/0 70 77 79 77 75 75 71 74
Animal T 42,983 30,214 42,714 45,709 49,840 53,913 73,021 72,221
Ranch- 0/0 30 23 21 23 25 25 29 26
ing
Source: BACEN, Yearly Rural Credit Reports
TABLE 22 - Value of Institutional Contracts, at constant (1977)
prices, by type of activity, from 1969 to 1976, in
Cr$l million
Agri- T
culture 0/0
Animal TRanch- 0/0
ing
1969
3,420
60
2,326
40
1970
3,598
67
1,758
33
1971 1972 1973 1974
4,843 5,561 6,868 8,547
65 64 60 59
2,612 3,139 4,634 5,866
35 36 40 41
Source: BACEN, Yearly Rural Credit Reports
1974
14,430
63
8,632
37
1976
15,686
62
9,518
38
4
- Type of Institutional Lenders and Amounts Lent
Institutional loans are primarily granted by the banking system.
Banks may be divided into four groups: Federal (government owned), state,
private and savings.
Bank behavior regarding rural lending is presented in Tables 23
to 25. Tables 23 and 24 show the number of institutional loan contracts
and the amounts granted, by type of financial agent, in 1976. As may be
seen, Federal Banks signed 61 percent of all rural contracts in the country,
while 93 percent of all rural contracts in the Northeast. In value terms,
Federal Banks lent 65 percent of total institutional loans granted in the
country, being also responsible for 88 percent of total institutional loans
in the Northeast.
TABLE 23 - Number of Institutional Contracts signed, by type of
financial agent, in 1976, in 1000 units, in Brazil and
in the Northeast
Federal Banks State Banks Private Banks Savings Banks
No. of No. of No. of No. of
Contracts % Contracts % Contracts % Contracts %
Brazil T 1116 61.0 167 9.0 490 27.0 29 1.5
North- 269 92.7 8 2.7 7 2.3 - -
east
No. of No. of
Contracts % Contracts %
31 1.1 1832 100
7 2.3 291 100
Yearly Rural Credit ReportSource: BACEN,
44
TABLE 24 - Value of Contracts signed by Financial Agents, at Constant
(1977) prices - Cr$1 million in 1976, in Brazil and in the
Northeast
Federal State Private Savings Cooper- Total
Banks Banks Banks Banks atives
Value % Value % Value % Value % Value % Value %
Brazil 120,515 65 19,079 10 43,082 23 1,552 1 1,554 1 185,782 100
North- 22,089 88 1,186 5 1,469 6 - - 461 1 25,205 100
east
Source: BACEN, Yearly Rural Credit Reports
On a Regional basis, Banco do Brasil signed 85 percent of contracts
and was responsible for 73 percent of loans granted (institutional), in
1976, as shown in Table 25. As may be seen, Banco do Brasil, Banco do
Nordeste do Brasil and Banco Brasileiro de Descontos signed the largest
amounts of contracts and Banco do Brasil, Banco do Nordeste do Brasil and
Banco do Estado do Pernambuco lent the largest volumes.
TABLE 25 - Number of Contracts Signed and Loans Granted to
Producers and cooperatives in the Northeast, in
1976, by financial agent
Contracts
Instituicao Financeira
Banco do Brasil S.A. (F)
Maranhao
Piaui
Ceara
Rio Grande do Norte
Paraiba
Pernambuco
Alagoas
Sergipe
Bahia
Banco do Nordeste do Brasil, S.A. (F)
Maranhao
Piaui
Ceara
Rio Grande do Norte
Paraiba
Pernambuco
Alagoas
Sergipe
Bahia
Banco do Estado de Pernambuco S.A. (S)-
Banco Nacional de Credito Cooperativo (F)
Banco Economico S.A. (P)
Banco Brasileiro de Descontos S.A. (P)
Banco do Estado da Bahia S.A. (S)
Banco Real S.A. (P)
Banco da Amazonia (F)
Total
Number
238,461
15,438
20,610
36,919
15,521
30,300
30,802
13,402
15,489
59,880
19,820
128
1,535
5,194
2,022
2,056
2,543
1,295
1,342
3,705
2,061
626
911
3,815
2,022
480
411
280,218
Value
(Cr$l, 000)
12,906,422
626,206
492,857
1,541,468
732,545
1,076,638
1,761,921
1,555,513
516,178
4,603,091
2,267,252
37,784
83,899
503,689
172,289
156,792
448,057
120,959
140,051
603,732
306,680
247,691
220,957
206,005
137,733
128,325
62,623
17,668,485
Source: Derur/Dipla/Secon - BACEN
F = Federal, S = State, P = Private
APPENDIX I
This appendix is to preseLt an estimate of the approximate subsidy
level received by farmers who borrow in the institutional market, and shown
as the difference of the yearly rates or interest charged and the rate of
inflation, for'short term production loans, for the period 1971 - 1977.
Actually, they reflect financial subsidies, given that economic opportunity
costs are not separately identified. It should be stressed that Institu-
tional Interest Rates shown are those charged to small farmers who do not
use industrialized or processed inputs, such as fertilizers, seeds, etc,
(because loans for the purchase of these inputs had no interest charged).
Inflation rates were based on the General Price Index as calculated
by the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV).
The appendix also shows the cruzeiros/dollar, official exchange
rates, for the same period, in Table 2.
TABLE 26 - Yearly Inflation Rates and Institutional
Rates of Interest
Yearly Yearly
Inflation Rates of
Year Rates Interest Difference.
1971 20% 12% -8%
1972 18% 12% -6%
1973 16% 11% -5%
1974 29% 10% -19%
1975 28% 10% -18%
1976 48% 13% -35%
1977 39% 13% -26%
Source: Centro de Cohtas Nacionais, FGV BACEN
TABLE 27 - Cr$/US$ Official Exchange Rates
the 1971-77 period
Year Cr$ /fus$
1971 5.3
1972 5.9
1973 6.1
1974 6.8
1975 8.1
1976 10.7
1977 14.1
Source: Revista Conjuntura Economica, FGV
During
Chapter II
THE STUDY - AREA
Introduction
In the first chapter rural credit market characteristics in the
Northeast of Brazil were presented as a general introduction to the analysis
of the credit market in a specific sub-region, identified here as the study
region of the Serra do Baturite, in the State of Ceara.
For the purposes outlined in the introduction to this study, con-
siderable detail regarding borrowers' and lenders' characteristics are
requited as well as information on their environmental conditions, so that
behavioral outcomes are correctly placed within an economic context.
Given that such detailed information is not available through
general statistical data, specific farmer interviews were undertaken and
will be presented in this chapter.
The basic purpose of the chapter, therefore, is to present in its
first part a description of the study-region regarding its main geographic,
demographic and economic characteristics; and in its second part a des-
cription of the sampling procedure and relevant sample results.
Regarding geographic characteristics, a brief description of climate
and soil conditions will be presented given that these are the basic
natural constraints on agriculture as well as determinants of the type
of output generated in the sector. Besides soil and climate, population
*data including growth and migration are also discussed. Finally, per-
formance of the primary and secondary sectors of the local economy are
shown, concluding the first part of the chapter.
In the second part, sampling procedures and outcomes are discussed.
This is necessary as an introduction to the next chapter, in which an
econometric analysis of lenders' and borrowers' behavior in both,
institutional and non-institutional credit markets is undertaken.
Geography
The Serra do Baturite region is composed of ten counties, occupy-
2ing an area of 3,822 Km , equivalent to 2.6 percent of the State of Ceara,
and distant 100 Km, southwest, from the State's capital, Fortaleza.
This region may be divided into two distinct ecological zones, the
Serra, or hilly, zone, and the non-Serra zone. The Serra zone incLudes
the following counties: Aratuba, Pacoti, Palmacia, Guarami ranga
and Mulungu. The non-Serra zone includes: Aracoiaba, Capistrano,
Baturite, Redencao and Itapiuna.
Regarding the climatic aspects, basic differences are related to
different altitudes, ranging from zero to 800 meters. In the non-Serra
zone the climate is of the hot and dry version; temperatures ranging from
240 to 350 Celsius. Rainfall indices average 850 mm/year, which is almost
half the Serra's index, and altitudes from 0 to 300 meters above the sea
level.
In the Serra zone temperatures average 200 Celsius, while altitudes
go from 300 to 300 meters above the sea level. Given its higher rainfall
indices, average of 1,400 mm/year, the climate is of the temperate and
humid version.
Climate typology, according to Koppen indices, show that Serra
areas belong to the AW class and non-Serra to the Bsh class.
Regarding soil conditions, they vary considerably within each zone.
In the non-Serra zone there are two distinct types of soil, i.e., of the
sandy-well drained-deep type and of the shallow-clay type. The former
is appropriate for manioc cropping and tle latter for corn, beans and
cotton (besides cattle ranching) cropping activities. In the Serra zone,
a more fertile type of soil is available, i.e., of the bulkie and heavy
textured-clay type. This soil is appropriate for coffee, banana, vegetables
and fruit crops. Because of the hilly type of terrain and high rainfall
indices, soil erosion is common.
Demography
The Serra do Baturite region's population, in 1970, was of 170,382
inhabitants, corresponding to 3.8 percent of the States' population.
From these, 134,480 persons (or 69 percent) were living in the rural areas
and 35,902 (or 31 percent) were living in the urban areas. Given that
2the study-region has an area of 3,822 Km , corresponding to 2.6 percent
of the States' area, it is the third largest human concentration, with a
2density of 44,6 hab/Km
As may be seen in Table , Serra counties are, usually, denser
than non-Serra ones, this being explained by better farming conditions,
chiefly in Baturite, Palmacia and Pacoti, where cropping of commercial
produce is more profitable because of better soil and climate.
From a dynamic point of view population growth rates are falling
since 1960, in the study-region, while rising for the State of Ceara, as
shown in Table .
TABLE 28 - Population Densities Within the Study-
Area, by County, in 1970
2
County Density(inhab/Km)
Non-Serra
Aracoiaba
Baturite
Capistrano
Itapiuna
Redencao
Serra
Aratuba
Mulungu
Palmacia
Pacoti
Guaramiranga
22.95
86.73
50.28
25.60
68.99
64.26
38.62
106.51
96.06
68.09
Source: Fibge, Census, 1970
TABLE 29 - Annual Population Growth Rates in the Serra
do Baturite and State of Ceara
1950/1960 1960/1970
Study-Region 1.91 .. 1,03
State of Ceara 2.13 ..2.95
Source: Fibge, Census
On a county basis, the following annual growth rates were observed:
TABLE- 30 - Annual Population Growth Rates in
the Serra do Baturite Region
County 1950/1960 1960/1970
Non-Serra
Aracoiaba .98 2.44
Baturite .82 .99
Capistrano .43 .16
Itapiuna 5.90 1.11
Redencao 1.60 1.13
Serra
Aratuba 1.59 .69
Mulungu 1.99 .59
Pamacia 6.85 .11
Pacoti 2.04 .16
Guaramiranga 0.85 .35
Source: FIBGE, Census
As may be seen, growth rates fell in all but two counties, which
were Non-Serra ones: Aracoiaba and Baturite. The reason given is that
coffee plantations, which sustained during the fifties the Serra's
agricultural labor demand, were erradicated because of excess production,
during the sixties, causing considerable migration from the study-region.
In a migration survey1 done in 1967, regarding the inflow of farmers
from other regions of the state to the capital, Fortaleza, it was found.
that the Serra do Baturite farmers represented 27 percent and 22 percent
*of total incomers, in two samples interviewing 3,783 and 28,909 farmers
53
respectively. The reasons given by interviewees, were low income and land
scarcity. The author of the study also conjectures about coffee erradica-
tion measures taken by government and the fall of sugar-cane prices. The
study also showed that migration within the study-area was common, i.e.,
from rural co urban areas.
Comparing population growth rates in rural and urban areas for the
study-region and for the State, it may be seen in Table that urban
growth rates fell in the region and in the State, but, rural growth rates
fell for the region but not for the State. This indicates that rural
economic conditions play an important role in the settlement preferences
of the population, and that urban congestion may be partly avoided by rural
settlement programs in which credit may play an important role.
TABLE 31 - Annual Population Growth Rates in Urban and Rural
Areas in the Serra do Baturite and State of Ceasa,
1950/60 and 1960/70
1950/1960 1960/1970
Urban Rural Urban. Rural
Study-Region 2.69 1.72 1.24 0.90
Source: FIBGE, Census data
State 4.94 0.93 4.68 1.91
The Economy
The Primary Sector
More than QC percent of the State of Ceara is in the semi-arid
zone of the Northeastern Region of Brazil and one of its most important
characteristics is the lack of a comprehensive irrigation system. One
consequence is that the agriculture sector is highly dependent on rainfall
occurances, a random element. The Serra do Baturite Region, more specific-
ally the Serra zone, is not so dependent given its natural rainfall per-
formances. This may be shown by comparing production performances in a
"dry" and in a "normal" year (1969 was a normal year and 1970 a dry year)
for four crops, in the Serra do Baturite Region and in other State regions
(the largest producers of each crop) in Table 32:
TABLE -32 - Proportional Changes in Production in a Dry Year (1970)
Compared to a Normal One (1969) in the Serra do Baturite
Region and in other State regions (largest producer in State)
Type of Crop Study-Region Other Regions
Rice - 58 % - 81 %
Sugar Cane + 2 % 0 %
Cotton -12 % - 62 %
Manioc + 4 % -.51.%
As may be seen in Table 32, natural conditions are more favorable
in the study-region than somewhere else in the State.
Agricultural production within the Serra zone may be divided into
two types, i.e., subsistence and commercial. Subsistence cropping is
mainly done in the lower parts of the Serra zone, i.e., in the "quebradas"
sub-zone; and commercial cropping in the upper parts.
Commercial crops are coffee, sugar-cane, rice, vegetables and
fruits. Subsistence crops are rice (of a different type), beans, corn
and fava-sprouts. Some commercial cropping is also done in the "queb-adas"
subzone such as tomatoes, carrots, sugar beets, cabbage and bananas.
In the non-Serra zone, chiefly in the "valley" sub-zone, rice and
sugar cane are the main commercial crops.
Besides the "valley" sub-zone, there is also the "sertao" area in
the non-Serra zone with a hot and dry climate as mentioned before, while
soil conditions are favorable for manioc, corn, cotton and cattle ranching
activities.
Agricultural crops may be divided into four groups, i.e., industrial
crops, fruits, vegetables and subsistence crops. Table 33 shows the
value of production of such crops for the Serra do Baturite region, in
1971, in Cr$1,000.
TABLE 33 - Composition of the Agricultural Value of Production
in the Serra do Baturite Region, in 1971
Group
Industrial crops
Fruits
Vegetables
Subsistence Crops
Cattle Ranching
Total
.Value of Production (Cr$1,000)
33.525
22.706
5.856
11.564
5.541
79.192
42.3
28.7
7.4.
14.6
7.0.
100.0
Source: Departamento Estadual de Estatistica
Regarding the value of production of specific crops, banana has
the largest value corresponding to 27.3 percent of total (Cr$79,192) and
is classified under fruits; sugar cane has the next largest value,
corresponding to 23.3 percent, and is classified under industrial crops;
then cOttOuL (industrial crops) with 11.9 percent; cattle with 7 percent;
coffee (industrial crops) with 6.7 percent; tomatoes (vegetables) with
4.5 percent; manioc (subsistence) with 4.4 percent; rice (subsistence)
with 4.2 percent; and all other with 10.7 percent.
Spacial distribution of the total value of production indicates
that 50 percent is generated in the Serra zone and the remaining 50 percent
in the non-Serra zone.
The Secondary Sector
Industries in the Serra do Baturite Region may be described as
primarily of the Transformation type, utilizing agricultural products as
their basic raw material. Production methods are, usually, primitive,
labor is unskilled and technology obsolete.
Table 34 shows the number of firms, value of production and employ-
ment levels, by ecological zone, in 1974, in the study-region.
As may be seen in table 35 , 93 percent of total regional value
of production in the sector are generated by the transformation (process-
ing) of sugar-cane, cotton, coffee and rice; while these industries
employ 22 percent of the labor force used in the sector.
Table 36 shows the industrial production in the Serra zone, and,
as may be seen, 56 percent of the value of industrial production were
generated by the processing of coffee, which employed only 8 percent of the
TABLE 34 - Number of firms, Value of Production and Employment in the
Secondary Sector of the Serra do Baturite Region, in 1974
Ecological Zone
Namber of
Firms
Value of Produc-
tion (Cr$1,000) Employment
Serra 180 6.252 1437
Non-Serra 44 70.256 475
Source: SUDEC/DDM
TABLE 35 - Number of Firms, Value of Production and Employment, by
type of industry, in the Serra do Baturite Region, in
1974
Number of
Firms
Value of Produc-
tion (Cr$1,000) Employment
Sugar-Cane Blocks
(Rapadura) 117 1.605 1,250
Coffee Processing 49 3.500 119
Sugar-Cane Spirits 7 2.377 118
Rice Processing 21 3.465 40
Cotton Processing 6 30.470 88
Lumber Processing 3 - 13
Lime Extraction 20 1.710 117
Total 224 76.508 1,912
Source: SUDEC/DDM
Activity
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TABLE 36 - Number of Firms, Value of Production and Employment
by Type of Industry, in the Serra Zone of the
Serra do Baturite Region, in 1974
Number of Value of Produc-
Activity Firms tion (Cr$1,000) Employment
Sugar-Cane Blocks 117 1,605 1,250
(Rapadura)
Coffee Processing 49 3,500 119
Sugar Cane Spirits 4 97 58
Rice Processing 10 1,050 10
Total 180 6,252 1,437
Source: SUDEC / DDM
labor force in the sector, in the respective zone.
The Sample
Information utilized in this study regarding individual farmer
characteristics and behavior were generated through direct interviews,
in the Serra do Baturite region, State of Ceara, during the months of
July and August, 1977, by the author, in conjunction with CEPA-CE . A
stratified sample of 320 farmers was selected, based on INCRA's (Instituto
Nacional de Colonizacao e Reforma Agraria) census of 1972.
Considering that the Serra do Baturite region presented a high
degree of heterogeneity regarding natural conditions, farm size and types
of output, it was divided, initially, into two distinct areas: Serra and
Non-Serra, each area including five counties. Serra counties being
Palmacia, Pacoti, Aratuba, Guaramiranga and Mulungu; while Non-Serra
counties being: Redencao, Aracoiaba, Capistrano, Itapiuna and Baturite.
Afterwards, farmers were stratified into four distinct groups
according to:
a) size-class
b) ecological zone
c) county
d) tenure condition
Non-Serra farms were divided into four size-classes (in hectares):
0-25, 25-100, 100-500 and more than 500 hectares.
Serra farms were divided into five size-classes (in hectares):
0-10, 10-50, 50-200, 200-500 and more than 500 hectares.
Tie Non-Serra farmer population contained 3,795 individuals, while
the Serra population 2,250, for a total of 7,159; according to INCRA.
Farmer location in the Regional space was plotted on specific maps
which were used for stratification purposes regarding ecological zone and
county. These maps showed the location of farms.
Type of tenure condition was defined by INCRA data.
Sample Size and Sampling Procedure
As mentioned before the sample size was arbitrarily defined to be
320. No other technical criteria generated this quantity but survey
costs. The sampling procedure used was the four-stage proportional
sampling method. Initially the total number of defined interviews (320)
was divided into two area groups (Serra and Non-Serra) proportional to
population data, generating 185 interviews in the Non-Serra area and 135
in the Serra area.
As a second step, each group was divided, proportionally, by size-
class according to the following formula:
c
nh Whn , where E Wh =1h=1
nh = number of questionnaires to belong to the hth size-clasj
W = Nh / N = weight
Nh = population belonging to the hth size-class
N = total population
n = number of questionnaires to be submitted in the respective
area (Serra and Non-Serra)
The third step was to define the number of questionnaires to be
submitted at a given ecological zone, belonging to a specific size-Jlass.
The following formula was used:
mj= Whjnh
mh = number of questionnaires to be submitted in the j's
zone to the h's size-class
Whi 
= hj / Nh
Nj= number of population units belonging to the j's zone and
h's size-class
The same procedure was used for the definition of the amount of
questionnaires to be submitted in each county and by tenure conditions,
using always population proportions as weights.
After the definition of the amount of questionnaires to be sub-
mitted considering size-class, ecological zone, county and tenure condi-
tion characteristics, a random sample within each category was selected.
Problems regarding the interview of selected farms were observed:
a) some selected plots have been sold, dismembered or added
to existing plots, since census data was published;
b) access to some plots was impossible because of rainy conditions
in the Serra region at the time of interview.
To compensate for such events, a triple stand-by list of randomly
selected farms, for each category, was elaborated. In case that this list
was exausted, the choice of which farm to select was delegated to the
interviewing personnel which received the instruction to select missing
farms within each group or category according to a cross drawn on the map
where plots were located in space. For some counties in the Serra region
this last procedure was used in almost half of the interviews because of
time constraints generated by unexpected rainfall prolongations and
availability of trained personnel, originally from other state institu-
tions.
Finally, after farmers had been interviewed, questionnaires were
critized and resubmitted in some cases. This procedure, nonetheless,
did not avoid the loss of thirteen questionnaires because of missing
information or inconsistencies.
For comparison purposes, Table 37 presents the total number of
existing property owners and non-owners (universe), in 1972, according to
Incra Census information; as well as selected ones (sample plan), by farm
size-class, and the actually obtained sample, in the Serra zone.
Table 38 shows the same information for non-Serra owners and non-
owners.
TABLE 37 - Total Number of Existing Owners and Non-
Owners, Sample Plan and Actually Obtained
Sample, by Size-Class, in the Serra Zone,
in 1972
Universe
Owners Non-Owners
Sample Plan
Owners Non-Owners
Sample
Owners Non-;wners
0 - 10 992 145 45 6 41 7
10 - 50 515 258 24 11 26 10
50 - 200 225 468 11 21 16 16
200 -500 47 301 1 13 2 9
> 500 9 76 0 3 0 2
Total 1785 1251 81 54 85 44
Source: Incra, Census 1972
TABLE 38. - Total Number of Existing Owners and Non-
Owners, Sample Plan and Actually Obtained
Sample, by Size-Class, in the Non-Serra
Zone, in 1972
Universe Sample Plan Sample
Size
(ha) Owners Non-Owners Owners Non-Owners Owners Non-Owners
0 - 25 1422 327 65 14 60 16
25 - 100 1181 113 55 4 54 8
100 - 500 458 322 19 15 19 12
> 500 81 219 3 10 3 8
Total 3142 981 142 43 136 44
Source: Incra, Census 1972
Size
(ha)
Sample Results
Basic sample results regarding farmer production, consumption,
financing characteristics and asset composition will be summarized in the
next paragraphs, by farmers' size-class.
As May be seen in Table 38A, the average value of own production,
i.e., the value of farmers' production not including any produce trans-
ference from share-croppers or payments to land owners, is 25 times larger
for the largest size-class as compared with the smallest (0 - 10 hectares).
The value of assets is 30 times larger for the largest size-class; the
value of yearly income is 40 times larger; the value of commercialized
production, i.e., the value of production sold in the market, is 45 times
larger and the value of production expenses increased 46 times.
Regarding the income composition of each type of farmer (by size-
class) the following is observed in Table 39:
a) For the smallest class (0 - 10 owners) commercialized production
is less than the total value of production meaning that part of it goes for
consumption. These farmers have also the largest share of outside income,
i.e., part of total income generated outside the farm, indicating that
income generated inside the farm is not sufficient for subsistence of
farmer's household, therefore having to compensate with work outside the
farm.
b) For all but two classes, commercialized production is larger
than own production with the exception of the smallest group (0 - 10
hectares) and the (25 - 50 hectares) group. The largest increment of
commercialized to own production is for the largest group, over 500
TABLE 38A - Average Asset Value, Production Expenditures, Own Production Value, Commercialized
Production, Basic Yearly Consumption, (utside income and total income of farmers,
by size class, in the Serra do Baturite Region, in 1977
Average
Assets
Class Value
(ha) (Cr$)
Average
Production
Expenditure
(Cr$)
Average
Value
.of Own
Production
(Cr$)
Average Average
Value of Basic Yearly
Commercialized Consumption
Production Expenditure
(Cr$) (Cr$)
Average
Yearly
Income
Generated
Outside
Farm (Cr$)
non-
owners 4,567
0 - 10 55,565 3,311
10- 25 93,520 11,729
25- 50 122,400 21,707
50-100 198,194 35,892
100-200 356,133 59,706
200-500 479,889 102,667
> 500 1,611,667 139,333
14,535
29,468
49,339
91,406
99,399
144,107
366,133
12,685
12,603
29,708
45,951
93,784
130,176
150,666
571,666
7,753
9,822
14,276
12,292
16,324
17,529
21,333
.. 20,000
16,438
12,661
22,702
13,439
39,162
31,166
12,222
429,000
29,123
25,264
52,410
59,390
132,946
161,342
162,888
1,000,666
(*) Includes renters and sharecroppers
Source: Sample from Serra do Baturite Region, CEPA"CE
Total
Income
(4 + 6)
(Cr$)
TABLE 39 - Income Composition of Farmers by Size-Class
Value Own Commercial Ourside
Production Production Production
Size-Class
(hectares) Total Income Total Income Total Income
0 - 10 .57 .49 .51
10 - 25 .56 .58 .42
25 - 50 .83 .79 .22
50 - 100 .69 .70 .30
100 - 200 .61 .81 .19
200 - 500 .88 .93 .07
> 500 .37 .57 .43
hectares, the difference coming, basically, from the rent extracted from
sharecroppers.
c) Large farmers, over 500 hectares, also get the largest share
of income generated outside the farm (with the exception of the two
smallest groups which have the lowest income levels) meaning that they
have plenty of resource allocation alternatives. As may be seen, only
37 percent of their total income is generated from own production, the
rest being rents from land use,received from sharecroppersand revenue
generated outside the farm in other activites.
d) With the exception of the largest group, income generated out-
side the farm decreases as farmers become larger, indicating that in the
study-region resource use alternatives are scarce for small and medium
farmers.
Regarding the comparison of Production Expenses to the Value of
Own Production, Table 40 shows that expenses increase, proportionally, -as
farmers get larger,-with the exception of the largest group. This is
indicative that the largest group is, probably, using more intensive
mechanized production processes, as will be shown at a later stage of
this chapter when the asset composition of farmers is discussed.
TABLE 40 - Ratio of Production Expenses to Value of
Own Production by Size-Class of Farmers
in the Serra do Baturite
Production Expenditures
Size-Class Value of Own Production
0 - 10 .23
10 - 25 .40
25 - 50 .44
50 - 100 .39
100 - 200 .60
200 - 500 .71
> 500 .40
Smaller farmers' production expenses are the lowest for all groups,
indicating that labor and other types of inputs are usually not bought or
hired by these farmers.
Regarding the amount of production sold and consumed by farmer
groups, it may be seen in Table 41 that:
a) Small farmers produce primarily for subsistence purposes while
larger farmers for commercial. As shown in Table4l, the ratio of Produc-
tion plus Consumption Expenses over Commercialized Production decreases as
TABLE 41 - Ratios of Expenses over Commercialized Produc-
tion and Value of Own Production, by Size-Class
Consumption & Production Consumption & Production
Expenses Expenses
Commercialized
Size-Class Production Value of Own Production
0 - 10 1.04 .90
10 - 25 .88 .88
25 - 50 .74 .69
50 - 100 .56 .57
100 - 200 .59 .78
200 - 500 .82 .86
> 500 .28 .44
farmers' size gets larger, the same happening to the ratio of Production
plus Consumption over the Value of Own Production. Table 41 also shows
that the first ratio (Production + Consumption Expenses / Commercialized
Production) is larger than the second for small farmers (0 - 10); and no
slacks between expenditures and revenues exist, indicating that production
is for consumption purposes and that commercialization of production is
for the only purpose of acquiring those goods not produced on the farm but
basic for subsistence.
b) Smaller farmers (up to 50 hectares) commercialize less than what
they produce as compared to larger farmers (50 hectares and up) who
commercialize more, the difference being accounted for consumption and
rental payments of smaller to larger farmers.
Regarding institutional production loans to farmers, by size-class,
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Table 42 shows that the larger the class, the larger the percentage of
attended farmers in the group, and the larger the average loan granted
(columns 4 and 6).
TABLE 42 - Allocation of Institutional Production Loans by Banks
and Cooperatives to Farmers, in 1977, in the Serra do
Baturite Region
Number of
Number of Farmers
Farmers Attended
in Class in Class
Value of
Loans
Percentage Granted
Attended to Class
in Class (Cr$1000)
Average Percentage
Loan of Total
Granted Loans
to Class Granted
-(Cr$) to Class
Non- *
Owners 89 12 13.5 195 16,250 6.97
0 - 10 63 10 15.9 74 7,400 2.o4
10 - 25 48 22 45.8 335 15,227 11.96
25 - 50 41 24 58.5 317 13,208 11.32
50 -100 37 24 64.9 701 29,208 25.04
100-200 17 12 70.6 594 49,500 21.22
200-500 9 6 66.7 410 68,333 14.64
> 500 3 2 66.7 173 86,500 6.18
Source: Serra do Baturite Region Sample
Includes renters and sharecroppers
Comparing the results shown in Table 42 and Table 34A the following
is observed:
a) As shown in Table 43, the ratio of Intitutional Loans to Produc-
tion plus Consumption Expenditures is, approximately, constant for all
size-classes, while the ratio of Loans to Production Expenditures fall as
farmers become larger, indicating that
Class
(ha)
- small farmers have part of their consumption and all production
expenses financed by the institutional system, when attended by
this source.
- as larger farmers become as less, the institutional system
finances their production expe :ses
TABLE 43 - Comparison of Production Loans and Production
Plus Consumption Expenses
Average Production
Loan
Production +
Consumption
txpenditures
Average Production
Loan
Production
Expenditures
0 - 10 .56 2.23
10 - 25 .58 1.30
25 - 50 .39 .61
50 - 100 .56 .81:
100 - 200 .64 .83
200 - 500 .55 .67
> 500 .56 .64
b) Table 44shows that the ratio of average production loans re-
ceived from the institutional system over value of own production is de-
creasing as farmers become larger, indicating that farmers become more
independent as their size increases, confirming the previous statement
regarding the proportion of expenses financed.
- Table 45 shows that farmers who do not possess land are not eligible
for receiving institutional investment loans given that there is no
Size-Class
TABLE 44 - Comparison of Production Loans and Value
of Own Production, by Size-Class, in the
Serra do Baturite Region
Average Production Loan
Size-Class
0 - 10
10 - 25
25 - 50
50 - 100
100 - 200
200 - 500
> 500
Value of Own Production
.51
.52
.27
.32
.50
.47
.24
TABLE 45 - Allocation of Institutional Investment Loans by Banks
and Cooperatives to Farmers, in 1977, in Serra do
Baturite Region
Number of
Class Farmers
(ha) in Class
Number of
Farmers
Attended
in Class
Percent-
age
Attended
in Class
Value of
Loans
Granted
to Class
(Cr$1000)
Average
Loan
Granted
to Class
(Cr$)
Percentage
of Total
Loans
Granted
to Class
Non- *
Owners 89 0 0.0 0 0 0
0 - 10 63 6 9.5 54 9,000 2.8
10 - 25 48 6 12.5 69 11,500 3.5
25 - 50 41 10 24.4 185 18,500 9.5
50 -100 37 18 48.6 743 41,300 38.1
100-200 17 7 41.2 545 77,800 28.0
200-500 9 6 66.7 278 46,300 14.3
> 500 3 2 66.7 72 36,000 3.6
Source:
Includes renters and sharecroppers
collateral to guarantee the transaction. Under certain conditions they
may buy land.
Table 45 also shows that investment loans increased 8.6 times as
the size of farmers increased, the same being observed for group attendance.
Tabl e 46 shows that the ratio of Average Investment Loans to Average
Value of Assets, by size-class, decreases as farmers become larger, but
increase up to medium sized farmers, indicating that medium sized are the
preferred target for investment lending by the institutional system.
TABLE 46 - Comparison of Average Investment Loans
to Average Value of Assets
Average Investment Loan
Size-Class Average Value of Assets
0 - 10 .16
10 - 25 .12
25 - 50 .15
50 - 100 .21
100 - 200 .22
200 - 500 .09
> 500 .02
Table 47 shows some non-institutional market characteristics, such
as:
- the percentage of attendance of farmers decreases as they become
larger indicating that non-institutional loans are granted to
those who do not get enough (or any) loans from the institutional
TABLE 47 - Non-institutional Moneylender and Trucker Loans
Granted by Size-Class, in 1977, as shown in
sample
Value of Average Percentage
Number of Percent- Loans Loan of Total
Number of Farmers age Granted Granted Loans
-Class Farmers Attended Attended to Class to Class Granted
(ha). in Class in Class in Class (Cr$1000) (Cr$) to Class
Non- *
Owners 89 41 46.1 148 3,610 54.6
0 - 10 63 18 28.6 62 3,444 22.9
10 - 25 48 8 16.7 16 2,000 5.9
25 - 50 41 4 9.8 13 3,250 4.8
50 -100 37 3 8.1 11 3,666 4.1
100-200 17 4 23.5 21 5,250 7.7
200-500 9 0 0.0 0 0 0.0
Source:
*
Includes renters and sharecroppers
system;
- The average loan granted in the non-institutional system is
almost constant for all size-classes,'.increasing slightly for
the larger farmers. The largest class do not borrow in this
market, probably because they get sufficient resources from the
institutional source.
- Regarding the constancy of the average loan granted, this may be
explained by the increasing proportion of institutional loans
received by larger farmers so that the non-institutional market.
becomes marginal for them while it is the main source of borrow-
ing for those not attended by the institutional system.
- Non-landowners are the main customers of the non-institutional
system getting more than half of, total loans granted and re-
presenting 52 percent of total custamers attended. More than
half of these borrowers got credit from non-institutional money
Yenders or truckers.
Consumption Credit
Consumption credit (credit in goods), on the other hand, is the
most expensive type of credit. Sample results indicate that 71 percent
of landless and 51 percent of small farmers up to 10 hectares use this
type of credit, while no large farmer, from 200 hectares up was using it.
Rates of interest ranged from 6 to 25 percent monthly depending on what
and how much was financed, to whom.
Asset Composition
Regarding asset composition, value of land corresponded, approxi-
mately, to 20 percent of total, for all classes, as may be observed in
Table 48. The share of construction sites decreased as farmers became
larger, and machinary plus equipments and animals, increased. This may
be in part because animals and machinary plus equipment were mostly
financed to larger farmers by institutional sources, at negative rates of
interest, in the last ten years.
TABLE 48 - Percentage Distribution of Farmers' Asset Composition,
by size-class, in 1977, as shown in sample
0-10 10-25 25-50 50-100 100-200 200-500 > 500
Land 19.6 15.4 15.8 28.3 19.7 29.0 13.4
Construction 67.4 63.0 34.2 46.1 42.7 45.2 27.5
Machinery & 7.6 13.8 4.6 16.0 23.8 15.6 33.2
Equipment
Animals 5.4 7.8 45.4 9.6 13.8 10.2 25.9
Source: Serra do Baturite Sample
Demand for Institutional Loans
Finally, analyzing the answers of farmers not belonging to the
institutional system, regarding the reasons for not doing so, it may be
seen, in Table 49, that the share of farmers which stated that they had no
sufficient guarantees for applying for these loans decreased from 62 percent
to nil, the larger they became. Those which were not attended because
they were in debt, increased; those who did not want any institutional
loan increased with size; those rejected by the institutional system
decreased with size; and those who would like to enter the system decreased
with size.
These results indicate the existing form of institutional credit
rationing system, regarding size-class, as interpreted by demand. Com-
paring them with previously shown institutional distribution patterns in
the Northeastern Region of Brazil, by FIBGE, as well as with distributions
shown by this sample, there are strong indications that the institutional
rationing system discriminates smaller farmers. This hypothesis is
tested at a later stage of this study and, actually, is one of the most
significant characteristics to explain not only institutional landers'
behavior but borrowers' expectations regarding credit transactions in
general.
Depending on lenders' opportunity costs of financial resources as
well as on financial market conditions, an institutional credit system may
not only generate direct benefits. to borrowers but indirect benefits to
potential ones by affecting their set of alternative borrowing sources.
Therefore it will be crucial to the market performance the way the institu-
tional rationing mechanism is set up. Economic growth or development may
be the outcomes as the institutional system expands.
TABLE 49 - Percentage Distribution of Resons for not Belonging to the
Institutional Credit System as Perceived by Non-Participating Farmers
Percentage Distribution of Answers (Number of Resp. = 100%)
Number of
Class : Farmers
(ha) in Class
Number of Debtor of Does not
Respondents Not enough Instit. want to Rejected Would beIong-
(=100%) collateral System Belong by banks Other if possible
Non *
owners 89 60 62 - 8 5 13 80
0 - 10 63 43 30 - 14 9 26 65
10 - 25 48 22 18 9 27 5 14 45
25 - 50 41 11 36 9 18 - 9 54
50 - 100 37 7 14 29 14 - 14 57
100-200 17 3 - 67 33 - - 67
200-500 9 0 - - - - - -
500 3 0 - - - - - -
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FOOTNOTES
1. Amelta A. N. Moreira, "Migraices para Fortoleza," ISNPS, Gov. Ceara,
1967.
2. Comissao Estadual de Planejamento Agropecuario do Estado do Ceara.
CHAPTER III
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
In the first two chapters a description of Regional as well as local
credit market characteristics was given. As shown, institutional lending
sources concentrated their allocations on medium and large farmers, both
in the Region as well as in the study area (The Serra Do Baturite Region).
Non-institutional loans, irrespective of type of lender or form of loan,
were granted to that part of the market which was not served by the
institutional system.
In this chapter an analytical framework will be presented so that
theoretical and empirical features are clearly identified when dealing
with specific aspects of market analysis and policy considerations.
The first task would be to describe the theoretical structure
embedding the empirical investigation regarding borrowers' and lenders'
behavior in the institutional and non-institutional sections of the finan-
cial market.
The second task would be to outline the type of empirical analysis
used for each segment of this market.
The third task would be to link theoretical formulations and empiri-
cal outcomes with policy analysis, done through cost-benefit evaluations of
changing existing institutional lending procedures.
- The first task: the theoretical structure
One of the main purposes of this study is to show that intermarket
effects, i.e., effects stemming from the type of behavior of the institu-
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tional supply on the non-institutional demand, are important in determining
borrowers' behavior in general. The second purpose is to examrne the
feasibility of spreading credit to small farmers.
The existence of intermarket effects on the demand schedule of
farmers is shown through an econometric analysis presented in the next
chapter, and the feasibility of spreading credit to small farmers is
analyzed in the fifth chapter, through a cost-benefit analysis.
The task of analyzing observed financial transactions requires,
initially, that some theoretical framework is formulated; if not, observa-
tions become meaningless. In this study a specific formulation regarding
individual borrowers' and non-institutional lenders' behavior is suggested
but its use is limited serving the ory purpose of indicating the set of
variables which could explain empirical phenomena.
The following discussion concerns a dynamic programming model
formulation for borrowing farmers, which may easily be extended to
individual lenders as will be shown later.
The purpose of this model is to present a systematic description-of
the derived demand for loans by farmers which own land. This model will
be helpful in specifying some empirical relations, to be tested somewhere
else in this study, regarding farmers' demand for loans. A dynamic pro-
gramming type of model is suggested given that intertemporality and goal
pursuing characteristics are believed to be present in the farmer decision
making process regarding loans.
The modeling process of farmers' credit demand requires that
economic activities which generate this demand be specified as well as the
system which links them, i.e., consumption, production and investments.
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Assuming that farmers are utility maximizers and their goal is to
maximize long-run yearly consumption levels, it is possible to write the
following objective furction:
(1) Max u(C1 .0. CT)
where C1 -... CT are yearly consumption levels. Consumption levels in
each year may be optimized, given a certain income schedule, through the
capital market, i.e., by borrowing and lending at a certain price. Alter-
natively, borrowing or lending may be necessary when there is a disequilib-
rium of desired and actual flows of resources at a given point in time.
But consumption is only possible if income exists or assets are depleted;
and ther- are roundabout methods to generate income. Borrowed funds may
be used for investment, to expand production which, ceteris paribus, would
increase income and consumption. The equilibrium conditions to be met by
any farmer at any given point in time t may be written as
F(2) Dt = C + I - Y + D (1 + r ) A A
Borrowing at any time t, (Dt) will be equal to consumption (Ct '
investment (I ) and previous debt payments [Dt-1 (1+rt)] minus the amount of
Fincome at t(Y ) and own (mobilized) financial stocks (AA ). As may be
seen, farmers may equilibrate in and outflows mobilizing part of their own
stocks before borrowing. Borrowing will be preferred if sacrificed con-
sumption in the future is lower than when using own stocks. The term
sacrifice, in this context presupposes an interemporal preference ranking
of consumption levels and given financial market interest rates. These
interest rates are also important in accessing the amounts of income
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transference from or to borrowers. These transferences generate positive
or negative consumption increments. If interest rates are negative it
would be worthwhile to borrow as much as possible because borrowing would
generate positive income transferences toward borrowers.
An important aspect of this formulation is that it is irrelevant
what part of inflows (income or asset mobilization AAF ) is used for what
purpose. Borrowing (positive or negative) must make up the difference.
This would not be so if loans were given for specific purposes.
Farmers may engage in three types of activities: consumption,
production and investment, therefore using economic resources for three
different purposes. As a next step in the modeling process, it is
necessary to specify what variables explain (determine) the behavior of
farmers regarding these activities so that equilibrating resource quantities
(lending or borrowing) be recognized given behavioral standards, farmer
goals and exogenous conditions and variables which generate or limit
activity levels. Putting it differently, disequilibrium is balanced
through lending or borrowing so that the utility of farmers is maximized.
Specifying the relationship of activity variables as function of technology,
market, institutional and other types of guiding variables, empirical
- hypothesis regarding individual credit demand behavior may be formualted
and tested.
Production net income generated within the farm is a function of
factor use intensity1 input and output prices, and interest rates.
A'ROD I FI I FI FI(4) = f(K, Lt , Nt Wt Lt, rt t) = f(Kt, Lt )Pt WLt
I o oFI I
-iKt - (1 + rt)Nt t P - WL tK - (1 + r)N
- H
t t
where rt = rate of interest of loans
Wt = opportunity wage
i = rental cost of capital goods
P = price of output received by farmer
K = capital used in production
FIL = family labor used inside farmt
N = industrialized inputst
Income may also be generated outside the farm by leasing family
labor somewhere else or making capital investments in non-farm businesses
such as commerce, loan businesses, etc. This is written:
(5) YOUT W LFo + P KFo
t t t + t t
where Wt= wage received by family labor employed outside the farm
FoL = amount of family labor employed outside the farm
pt = capital returns of farmer capital employed outside the farm
K _= amount of farmer capital employed outside the farm
t
It becomes obvious that as higher Wt or pt, compared to factor
returns when used inside the farm, as more resources would be diverted to
outside farm activities, given objectives and farmer conditions. Total
farmer net income is written as:
(6) Y = PROD + YOUT
t t t
The main reason for income partition in two groups comes from the
timing characteristic of each. Income generated outside the farm YOUT
PROD
refers actually to revenue with a higher time frequency than Y , given
that the later is, usually, a function of natural (time) cycles (cropping,
for instance, is only possible once (or twice) a year) and the former (Y OUT
a function of mutual contractual agreements between economic agents when
producing economic goods or services, like wages, capital rental payments,
etc., which are, usually, in a monthly basis.
The effect of different timing characteristics on the demand for
loans, is obvious, mainly if the demand is originated by cash-flow
irregularities.
Given farmers' opportunities and rates of return, they may engage in
a third stype of activity, i.e., investments. The expansion of capital
resources in or outside the farm is a function of future returns and the
rate of interest, being written as:
PI PI
t 'PI k t+1''k T, rt+1  rT)
PO P0O(
(8) It O AA = t+' T, rt+1 ...rT)
(9) 1T PI PO
t AA + AA
As a final step in the modeling process a set of basic conditions
have to be
and farmer
The
(10) LFO
(11) KFO
(12) Kt
(13) Kt
(14) At
(15) LFLt
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stated so that model results stay within acceptable dimensions
constraints be incorporated in the analysis.
first set of conditions refers to factor returns and constraints:
= fE (W 7T )t' L
= fK~pt' rk)
< AF
t
AFO
=AF t
= A
FO
= t
+ A FO
FI
+ Lt
Equation (10) states that the total amount of family labor which is
going to be diverted to outside employemnt is a function of outside wages
and internal production returns (WL) of labor. Equation (11,) states theL
same for capital use. Equation (12) states that total capital used inside
the farm in production cannot exceed available stocks. Equation (13)
states the same for capital used outside the farm. Equations (14) and (15)
give total available family labor and capital assets (stocks).
The second set of conditions refer to initial and final desired
stock of assets:
(16) A, = A
(17) AT =AT
The third set give borrowing or lending flow directions and debt
stock conditions:
(18) Dt-l (1 + rt) > 0
(19) DBt - 0
(20) Dt > 0
(21) DB < AT
(22) Dt-l( 1 t+ rt) DBt-l(1 + rt) + D - DBt
(23) Dt-1(1 + rt) < DBt-l(1 + rt
Equations (18), (19) and (20) state that past debt repayments,
total debt stock and yearly borrowing must be larger or equal to zero.
Equation (21) states that total debt in the final year must be less or
equal to value of assets. Equation (22) says that total accumulated debt
at time t is equal to total accumulated debt in the previous period plus
new borrowings minus debt repayment. Equation (23) states that debt
repayment cannot be larger than past accumulated debt.
A final constraint refers to the availability of financial assets
and capital assets.
(24) A = AF + A AF
t
PI PI PI(25) At =A t + AA
PO PO PO(26) At = A t.+ A
tt-
As seen, this model may be divided into four parts: an objective
function, a borrowing landing equilibrium condition, some economic activity
generation and conditional equilibrium equations. There is no limit to
borrowing or lending but the ones stated by conditional equations.
Borrowing would go on until marginal gains in consumption equal marginal
losses. Economic production and investment are mere instruments to gener-
ate consumption. If returns from these activities are lower, in the long
run, in terms of consumption gains, borrowing goes directly to financing
of consumption. On the other hand, if returns generate higher consumption
(in present discounted terms) then it is worthwhile to farmers to engage
in investment activities.
A Review of Model Equations
(1) Max u(C.. .C T)
F(2) D = C + I - Y + D (1 + r )-AA
t t t t t-1 t
(3) yPROD Q tP - WtL - iK - (1 + rt)Nt t Wt t it t
I Ft
where Qt f(Kt, Lt t
(4) TOUT W LPO + KFOt t t tt
PROD OUT
(5) Y = TPRD + Y
t t t
I = fE (kTt ''kiT. rt+1...r )
t PI k t+ k t+1 T
I = AAo = f* (1t,..T r)+
L FO
t
KFO
P0
KFI
t
A
t
LF
Lt
(6)
(7)
(8)
= FI
=At
LFO
= t
aQt
t
1t = P
KOt =L t
+ A FO
+ L
t
A,= A
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
=AA +AAP
W t' Lft
K t' k t
<AFI
= t
A FO
t
AT 
= AT
DtT(1+ rt -0
DBt > 0
Dt > 0
DBT AT
Dt-1 -+ rt DBt-(1 + rt) + Dt - DBt
(22) Dt-l(1 + rt < DB t-(1 + rt
F F - T-(23) At =A +AA
PI PI PI(24) At = At + AA
P0 P0 P0(25) At = A + AA
t t-1
Given this theoretical framework (or model) regarding the decision
making process of borrowers, the next step would consist of generating
institutional and non-institutional lender models.
For institutional lenders the analytical framework would, in
essence, be reduced to the understanding of institutional lending rules,
at least regarding the selection of specific variables. Examining these
rules, as presented in Chapter I, it becomes obvious that assets, education
and land ownership are important characteristics besides past behavior
(performance) regarding debt repayment and the value of existing debt.
Besides lending rules, pricing, amounts lent and costs must also
be considered. When these variables are incorporated, it becomes obvious
that a rationing process exists and that some groups or types of borrowers
may be getting more out of the system than others given that revenues
per unit and quantities to be lent are fixed.
Available pricing data lead to the conclusion that negative prices
in real terms are charged from all borrowers of the institutional system.
This means that under certain conditions the demand may be infinite.
Therefore, the analysis of the type of rationing mechanism becomes crucial
for explaining "who" and "how much" each type of borrower is getting in
terms of loans. The question regarding the "who" can be answered by
comparing individual farmers' characteristics and their success or failure
in getting institutional loans. The "how much" wouM be a function of the
same characteristics and past behavior regarding previous compromises,
as stated in the legal framework presented in Chapter I.
Non-institutional lenders' behavior is explained by the same type
of dynamic framework specified for borrowers. The basic difference refers
to the investment part of the model. As mentioned before in the borrowers
model, investments may be undertaken within the farm or outside it, in
other types of activities. A non-institutional lender may be assumed to
have a specific type of outside activity, i.e., investing in other farmers'
activities. Besides, he may not be a farmer at all, but engaged in pro-
duction as well as consumption, as any other economic agent. He may be
using capital and labor resources in these productive activities and may
be borrowing from somebody else at the same time.
Regarding the investment part of the lenders model, the following
conceptual framework is considered: individual lenders have the problem
of selecting a specific set of investment opportunities so that their
portfolio maximizes their objective function. Total amounts to be lent
are flexible and function of intertemporal utility maximization. Given
that risk and uncertainty are not included in the suggested borrowers
model, but become important aspects for lenders, mainly risk because of
default, this may be included into the lenders framework as an additional
cost reducing the value of the capital returns parameter ( Actually
an entire matrix of GK's would be considered, one for each type of farmer
(borrower).
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The selection of a given portfolio composition by the lender would
be part of a long-run decision making process regarding investments,
production and consumption activities.
- The second task: an outline of the empirical analysis.
Considering that one of the main purposes of this study is to
evaluate costs and benefits of different types of lending programs and
that farmers' benefits accruing from borrowing are best explained by their
own demand functions, the results of the empirical investigation to be
presented in Chapter IV regarding the statistical evaluation of these
demand schedules are utilized when benefits are calculated in Chapter V.
On the other hand, interm'arket effects were hypothesized as influenc-
ing demand schedules making it necessary to incorporate institutional
rationing procedures into these schedules. For this, institutional
resource allocation functions were specified and estimated as well.
For the institutional supply model, two independent regression
schemes were run, i.e., a PROBIT model which estimates the probability of
access that any type of local farmer has to the institutional system,
given his characteristics, and an Ordinary Least Squares model which
estimates the average volume transacted by each farmer in the institutional
system.
For the non-institutional market an econometric system was specified
in which prices and quantities are assumed to vary freely and are mutually
determined. It was assumed that observed price-quantity combinations were
equilibrium ones and that these observations were determining individual
demand functions but not individual supply functions. Instead of supply
functions as ordinarily defined, transaction schedules were specified.
The reason for this is that available information regarding transacted
quantities refer, actually, to total amounts borrowed by a farmer but not
total amounts lent by a lender, given that data was obtained from farmer
(borrower) questionnaires. There is no lender information as such.
Thus, econometrically derived "supply" functions actually refer to
transaction schedules in which a price-quantity relation shows how an
individual lender reacts, in terms of prices, to individual borrowers'
requests for given quantities, given farmers' (borrowers) characteristics.
They are marginal adjustment relations in terms of portfolio compositions.
One outcome is that it is not possible to perform any aggregate market
analysis.
e The Third Task: Cost-benefit Analysis
The third task of this chapter is to explain-the linkage of
theoretical and empirical considerations with policy analysis. As mentioned
before when discussing the demand for credit in the dynamic programming
model, prices of loans were the costs of borrowing. If farmers could get
loans at lower prices this would increase their income levels.
There is, in this case-study, an alternative cheap credit source,
which is the institutional system. This system is government regulated
and sustained. Policy considerations in this context would refer to con-
traction, expansion or other kind of changes in the system, and the
analysis would be reduced to the comparison of costs and benefits of
different institutional lending programs.
Regarding the benefits of such programs, it may be seen that, as
any individual borrower is absorbed by the institutional system, he is
going to pay lower rates of interest for any amount he gets in this sub-
market. This may also be interpreted as an increase in his consumer-
surplus generated by the amount of additional resources available, at
lower prices.
From the costs side, as new borrowing farmers are absorbed by the
institutional system resources are lent at less than going market prices.
These loans have an opportunity cost corresponding to the difference in
lending prices. Besides these opportunity costs to institutional lenders
there are also transaction costs mainly of the administrative type. In
this study these transaction costs are not included, neither to lenders nor
to borrowers. Therefore, net benefits are overestimated.
Finally, two independent feasibility analyses are presented.: One
referring to the analysis of costs and benefits of transferring a given
farmer to the institutional system, and another examining the possibility
of extending institutional credit to a group of farmers (small farmers)
keeping the existing total amount of resources to the group, constant.
APPENDIX II
A SOURCE SELECTION MODEL BY FARMERS
The selection of the source of credit (institutional or non-institu-
tional) by farmers which are land owners is assumed to depend on transac-
tion costs (interest rates plus other related costs).
Define CB = Total institutional (formal, cheap) credit costs
CK = Total non-institutional credit costs
Total non-institutional credit costs consist of interest rates
solely, because they are granted in an informal way and sources are,
usually, nearby farmers. Institutional credit includes other costs given
formal lenders' location in space as well as legal requirement fees and
taxes.
Institutional loans' cost composition may be written as:
CB
AC 
=
nda =
nde =
FC =
r =
n =
d =
a =
rx + ACB
nda + ndc + FC
transportation costs c = food and shelter
costs/km
food and shelter costs
legal requirement fees and taxes
amount borrowed
institutional interest rate
number of trips to institutional source
distance from institutional source
transportation costs/km
Non-institutional loans' cost composition will be written as:
CK = kx
k = non-institutional interest rate
x = amount lent
The borrower will select the non-institutional source if:
kx < rx + nd(a + c) + FC
or k < r + nd(a +'c) + FC
x
As may be seen, even if interest rates are low ( or negative in real terms)
this does not guarantee that farmers are interested in obtaining institu-
tional loans because of ACB costs (additional transaction costs). If
expected amounts of loans are small or even zero, costs may go to
x
infinity.
It is also possible that non-institutional lenders provide addi-
tional benefits to borrowers if other types of services are included in
the loan transactions, making indifferent situations regarding costs tend
to their favor.
APPENDIX III
A SIMPLIFIED, TWO PERIOD, VERSION OF THE DYNAMIC BORROWING MODEL,
ALLOWING ACCESS TO CHEAP CREDIT SOURCES
One aspect of farmer's decision making process refers to cases of
changing interest rates or market conditions.
Assume that a farmer who was not eligible or self-excluded himself
from an existing cheap credit system, becomes eligible.
OUT PROD
Originally he has two sources of income: Y and YP . In the
OUT
first period he gets only Y (while engaging in cropping activities
which are only available, during the second period.) In the second period
he gets YOUT and YPROD. The combination of both types of income for periods
one and two is shown as pointl in the graph.
As mentioned, the farmer is eligible for a certain, rationed, amount
of loans, whose interest rate is negative in real terms, corresponding to
the distanee YOUT - Y1 in the graph. This combination of loans and a given
interest rate traces a transaction opportunity line, AB, in terms of con-
sumption "bundles" for periods one and two, where Y is maximum possible
consumption in the first period and Y2 is consumption in the second period,
if loans are used entirely for consumption purposes (point 2 in graph).
Alternatively there is a possibility to use the loan in expanding
production, or any other opportunity, which has a given positive return.
The farmer may use part or all of the loan in that activity. If used
entirely for production, his total income in period two would be equal
3to Y , tracing an opportunity line DIE regarding consumption alternatives
in the two periods.
Graph 1
OUT PRODY +Y
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A
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The actual amounts diverted for production or used in consumption
in period one would be a function of his preference scheudle determined by
the tangency of his utility curve and opportunity line DE. Assuming that
tangency at point H is the preferred one, the amount of loans used in
production would be the difference of OY1 and OYD, and consumption being
YD in period one and Y in period two.
Looking from the lender's point of view, who presumably granted
the loan for production purposes (or investment), this shows that the
farmer will do his best to be at his prefered combination point and not
use loans entirely for the original purpose, unless expected returns and
preferences coincide for doing so. If, on the other hand, better oppor-
tunities exist outside the sector and consumption be increased further,
the chance for diverting resources out of the sector increases.
One aspect worth mentioning is that returns must go to the loan
receiver (farmer) and not be transferred to second parties because of
market imperfections, as usually is observed with small farmers. Compen-
sating market prices are not sufficient to guarantee higher returns to
farmers. Lack of transportation facilities, for instance, are one type
of distortion in the system given that those who provide transportation
to farmer goods may extract all the benefits from favorable market prices,
reducing the efficiency of credit programs and diverting the benefits to
non-target groups.
A second aspect worthwhile to mention is that, if traditional
characteristics regarding production possibility frontiers, types of
indifference curve maps and farmer behavior are assumed, results will
reinforce the argument that only part of borrowed funds will be used for
the original purpose of funds (loans). This may be shown as follows.
Assuming that the only possibility open to the farmer is to further
expand farm production (given his production possibility frontier) there
will be just one point which maximizes the use of factors and his utility-
that is, the point of tangency of the production possibility frontier,
the transaction opportunity line and his indifference curve. See graph 2,
point A. This is certainly to the right of the original equilibrium.
If, on the other hand, he was not originally at an optimum, he may
get there but always to the right of the original point, If there is
another, better, opportunity outside the sector he will choose this
later one. See graph 3.
Y2.
YY1
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CHAPTER IV
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
Rural credit in the Serra do Baturite Region is granted to farmers
by two types of lending sources: institutional and non-institutional. It
has been shown that chronologically the institutional credit system
was superimposed on the non-institutional (informal) one and that non-
institutional loans shrank in volume and number, while farmers' alterna-
tives changed given that prices of credit in the formal system were
negative in real terms and quantities available larger.
Regarding the institutional system, Chapters I and II showed that
the number of farmers attended as well as amounts granted varied with size
of farms (property) and that the system had its own rules defined exogen-
ously by government authorities. Farmers would be granted institutional
loans if:
(a) their individual characteristics fitted institutional require-
ments
(b) their productive capabilities complied with certain minimum
financial returns.
A second set of observations, this time regarding the non-institu-
tional system referred to the pricing mechanism indicating that rates of
interest in this market were free to vary and quantities transacted in
apparent equilibrium. Therefore, econometric analysis of market partici-
pants was divided into an analysis of the institutional system and one of
the non-institutional one; borrowers (farmers) being visualized as pursuing
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a common set of behavioral conditions and rules (as shown in the previous
chapter) while lenders having different objectives and behavioral patterns.
The modeling of such a phenomena for empirical hypothesis testing
purposes considers chat borrowers were passive regarding the institutional
market but active regarding the non-institutional one, i.e., given that
prices and quantities in the institutional market were given, farmers
(borrowers) would have to submit to existing lending rules on a "take-it
or leave-it" basis, while they would be active in the non-institutional
market in the sense of bargaining prices, quantities and conditions.
The Institutional Credit Model
Credit transactions in general depend on lenders' and borrowers'
willingness to transfer and receive financial resources for a pre-set
period of time, at a given price.
Conceptually, from the farmers' demand point of view, the choice
of source as well as the potential amounts borrowed and prices paid are
not independent of a larger economic decision making framework regarding
production, consumption and investment activities.
Chapter III presented a dynamic behavior model, in which credit
is inserted in this broader framework; as well as a source selection model
which suggests that the choice of credit source by farmers is a function
of total transaction costs and not only the rates of interest charged by
lenders.
From the supply point of view, given that institutional resources
were supposed to be lent at negative prices, a rationing mechanism is
enforced. This assumption (or fact) dominates the model formulation
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because, at least in principle, the demand for financial resources at
negative prices would be infinite. The institutional rationing mechanism
dictated who was going to be attended and how much each attendee was
supposed to be granted, at least in terms of maximum amounts.
Given these considerations, two distinct-but related econometric
formulations were used. The first dealing with the likelihood of an
institutional transaction to be observed, and the second with the amount
of resources that a specific type of farmer was, in average, receiving,
given his characteristics.
The use of farmer characteristics is conceptually required in the
first model but not in the second. The choice of farmer characteristics
to explain individual attendance or transaction success becomes obvious
not only because of formal rationing procedures but also because of the
type of market imperfection existent in financial markets involving person-
to-person negotiations.
The Set of Institutional Variables
The first institutional model examines the likelihood of farmer
attendance by the institutional system, given his characteristics. As
stated in the legal framework of the institutional credit mechanism, in
Chapter I, farmers may be eligible if, among other things, ownership is
comprobated. Non-owners are only eligible if some type of legally accepted
document stating the conditions and type of deal and partnership to owners,
is formally submitted. Therefore, ownership was selected as a plausible
variable to explain the likelihood of a transaction. Its hypothesized sign
in the regression analysis is positive, given that owners are supposed to be
accepted.
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A second variable which seemed indicative of transaction success or
failure is the size of the farmers' property, as shown in previous chapters
by Census and Sample da.a. The larger the size the higher the percentage
of attended farmers. Given that there is a close relation of the size of
a farm and the value of assets, and that collateral is an important
element in credit transactions; assets instead of land size was selected.
Its expected sign in the regression analysis is positive, meaning that the
larger its value the larger the probability of acceptance to the system.
A third variable was included in the acceptance model, i.e.,
education. The reason is that it is claimed that farmers have problems in
communicating with the banking bureaucracy. It is true that banking
procedures require a set of legal paperwork that is not easily understood
by the non-formally educated farmers. Therefore, credit transactions may
be hindered because of lack of formal education of borrowers. A dummy
variable "education" was tested, and farmers with no education at all
(formal education) or barely educated, were considered as not-educated
while farmers with at least one year of formal education, were considered
educated. The expected sign of this variable in the regression is positive,
meaning that educated farmers have a better access to the institutional
system.
Given that for an institutional transaction to be successful,
borrowers must be willing to submit to the institutional rules, and this
would only be so if there are net gains from it, transaction costs besides
the rate of interest should also be included as a source selection
identifier. Considering that these costs were not available as such but
only a proxi to them, i.e., the distance of the farm to the nearest
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institutional borrowing source; distance was included in the model. Its
expected sign in the regression is negative, meaning that the larger the
distance the larger such costs and the lower the willingness to transact
the pre-set quantity.
The second institutional model drals with the amount of loans a
farmer gets once he is accepted by the institutional system.
Referring back to the legal institutional framework regarding the
limits for production and investment loans, it may be seen that production
loans should, in principle, "not exceed 60 percent of expected production
value ... " and investment loans should not exceed 100 percent of net worth,
in some cases, or less than that in others. The main aspect here is that
both types of loan constraints are closely related to assets, i.e., the
value of production and net worth, as may be seen in Tables and
for each size-class in the first case, and, assuming debt is regularly
paid off, net wealth becomes equal to value of assets in the second case.
Therefore, the value of assets was also used for explaining quantities
transacted, its expected sign being positive implying that larger farmers
get larger loans.
A second variable already used in the source definition model is
education. But here it played a more extensive role than in the first
model. Education was considered as an important instrument in explaining
quantities because it was assumed that when dealing with institutional
lenders as such, information regarding the functioning of the institutional
system as well as the capacity for negotiating loan quantities were better
understood and bargained by formally educated farmers. Its expected sign
in the regression analysis is positive.
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Finally, land ownership was also included in the quantity model
because part of farmers included as non-owners, such as renters, received
institutional loans and it would be possible that they also received
different treatment by institutional lenders than the one usually given to
regular land owners. If this hypothesis were not true land ownership
would not be as significant as in the access model, or not significant at
all. Its expected sign is positive as in the first model.
Econometric Analysis of Institutional Transactions
Econometric specification and estimation of the institutional
transaction likelihood and quantity models were based on the preceeding
arguments, but used different statist'cal instruments.
The source selection, or likelihood, model used a PROBIT model,
which is associated with the cumulative normal probability function that
is defined as having as its value the probability that an observed value
of a variable X (for every X) is less than or equal to a particular X.
On the other hand, there is an index Z which is a transformation
of X values, so that the higher Z the greater the likelihood of an event
happening. The PROBIT model assumes that the Z values of each individual
(which has a given set of characteristics X) are normally distributed so
that, given Z values, the probability is computed through:
Zi
P = F(Zi) = e- /2 ds
which is the cumulative normal function. As may be seen, the probability
is a function of index Z, and Z of the characteristics X, or:
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Z = a + b(X1 ) + c(X2) '''
The value of these parameters are estimated through the maximum likelihood
method given that the cumulative normal transformation is not linear
and dependent variable observations are rot continuous assuming only 0
or 1 values, generating non-normality and heteroscedesticity of the error
term. In this study, farmer characteristics regarding the volume of assets,
the level of education and ownership, determine a Z value (given regressed
parameter values). Given the intensity of Z, a larger or smaller proba-
bility of an institutional transaction will be stated by entering Z values
into the F(Z) equation.
For the estimation of the non-linear model, the Berndt, Hall, Hall
and Hausman1 algorithm was utilized.
Model estimation is described as follows:
B = a + a2 ASSETS + a3 OWNERSHIP + a EDUCATION + a5 DISTANCE,
where
B = 0, if an institutional transaction was not observed and,
1, otherwise.
ASSETS = -value of farmers' assets in Cr$1,000
OWNERSHIP = 0, if farmer is not an owner and 1, otherwise
EDUCATION = 0, if farmer has less than a year of formal education,
1, otherwise
DISTANCE = distance in kilometers of farm location to nearest
bank
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Regression results show the following values for the parameters:
Z = -1.71 + 0.0054 ASSETS + 0.8838 OWN + 0.4616 ED + 0.0074 DIST
(7.165) (6.21) (4.43) (2.32) (1.76)
Values in parenthesis represent asymptotic t statistics
Number of observations: 307
As may be seen, the coefficient of ASSETS is positive and signifi-
cant, implying that, ceteris paribus, an increase in the farmer's value of
assets of thousand couzeiros, increas the probability of an institutional
transaction by .0054. OWNERSHIP has a positive sign and is also signifi-
cant in explaining the probability of success in observing an institutional
transaction, this being a supply determined constraint. EDUCATION has a
positive sign and is significant at a 99 percent level of confidence, but
DISTANCE is getting an opposite as expected sign, being significant only
at a 90 percent level of confidence. The expected sign for DISTANCE is
negative, as demonstrated in Appendix I but, given that there were two
institutional lenders in the Serra do Baturite Region at the time of the
survey, it seems that existing distances from farms to those lenders were
not a hinderance for the success of transactions.
Regarding the quantity model, i.e., average quantity lent to farmers,
the ordinary (weighted) least squares method was used to estimate the
parameters as well as test the hypothesis regarding the-behavior of
institutional lenders in granting loans to farmers; assuming that unilateral
non-price rationing procedures defined granted financial resources. For
this, the following specification was used:
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LOG Q = S + 2 LOGASSETS + 53 EDUCATION + S OWNERSHIP
where Q = Quantity transacted, and LOGQ its logarithm '
LOGASSETS = the logarithm of the value of farmers' assets (in
Cr#l,000)
EDUCATION and OWNERSHIP are as defined in the previous model.
Regression results show the following values and signficance of parameters
and variables:
LOGQ = -1.2529 + 0.642195 LOGASST + .39 ED + .666 OWN
(1.90) (5.19) (1.69) (1.61)
Values in parentheses are t statistics.
Number of observations = 139
R2 = 0.24
Again, ASSETS are positively related with quantity and significant.
What is enlightening is that the amount granted by institutional lenders
is proportionally decreasing as the amount of assets increase. EDUCATION
and OWNERSHIP are again positively related and significant at the 90 percent
level of confidence. OWNERSHIP being significant implies that renters do
not get the same treatment as owners, ceteris paribus.
2
Low R indicate that there is more to be explained regarding the
institutional system's resource allocation process. Existing farmers'
debts, length of time operating within the system, past repayment behavior
and other institutional requirements were not available within the sample
data set, which could have improved results.
Statistical analysis show that assets, ownership and education are
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important variables in the decision making process of who is getting
institutional credit and how much. When regression results are compared to
the legal framework presented in Chapter 1, as well as to regional and
local Census and Qumple results, it becomes clear that goals aret not
accomplished, primarily regarding small farmers, given that specific
attention is recommended by the legal framework. As may be observed,
both the source selection (likelihood) and quantity equations have a
negative intercept value meaning that certain minimum conditions must be
fulfilled by farmers to be incorporated or absorbed into the institutional
lending system.
Table 50 shows a comparison of sample averages with regression pre-
dictions, by size-class, for institutional borrowers, regarding class attend-
ance, asset values and quantities granted, against probability of attendance
and quantities predicted. Probabilities and quantities predicted by re-
gression equations were calculated for educated and non-educated farmers,
assuming that the average distance for any farmer to the nearest institu-
tional source is 35 kilometers. Non-owners were not considered.
Comparisons show that the probability model describes fairly well
the percentage of attendance in each group, with exception of the smallest
and the 100-200 ha-group whose probabilities are overestimated compared
to actual attendance. Transacted quantities predictions, on the other
hand, are worse for the three middle range groups, being all consistently
underestimated by the model. As may be seen, standard deviations within
each class increase up to the last class, denoting the presence of heter-
oscedasticity. To account for this, weighted least squares were used, but
predictions still underestimated allocations to these groups. Considering
TABLE 50 - Regression Results Compared to Observed Sample Data
Percentual
attendance
by institu-
tional
system of.;
total farm-
ers i~n
classas-
given in.
sample
Probability of
attendance as
predicted by
regression model
to a farmer with
asset value equal
to average class
value, educated
and not
Average
institutional
loan
granteded
to attend
farmers in
class, in
Cr$1,000
Average predic-
ted loan for
educated and
non-educated
farmer in
class with
same average
asset value
Sample
standard
deviation
of
granted
loans to
class
Average
asset
value in
class, in
Cr$1,000
0-10
10-25
25-50
50-100
100-200
200-500 100
500 > 100
Class
40 58
48 65
54 71
69 83
86 96
98 99
100 100
9.143
17.263
17.928
51.571
87.615
98.286
81.666
7.373
10.883
10.283
15.178
17.125
25.277
16.591
24.490
24.183
35.696
29.260
43.190
63.788
94.155
3.676
9.158
10.745
43.698
- 116.684
125.231
18.930
56
94
208
203
352.
479
1612
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the purposes of these models, i.e., to infer non-institutional as well as
institutional behavior, mainly for small farmers, which are the pre-
dominant non-institutional borrowers, no further improvements were made
in the model.
The Non-Institutional Credit Model
Originally, the non-institutional credit market was the pre-
dominant source of financial funds in the rural sector of the study-region.
From the mid-sixties onwards government decided to divert a substantial
quantity of financial resources at negative rates of interest into the
sector, through the institutional banking system. This changed consider-
ably the existing patterns of financial. resource allocation. Non-
institutional lenders' clientelle was reduced to that part of the financial
market which was not attended by the institutional system.
Non-institutional lenders, nonetheless, were not all pure
financial agents involved exlcusively in money lending activities, but
could be divided into four types of transactors:
- moneylenders, which engaged in pure financial transactions
with farmers;
- truckers or merchants, which usually lended their financial
resources as part of a larger deal involving the purchase
of produce from the farmer at the harvest season;
- relatives or friends, which lend resources for future re-
payment in terms of other or same type of favors;
- grocers, who did not lend financial reosurces as such but
sell goods on credit.
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It becomes obvious that for the purposes of this study, only
money lender transactions become interesting given that all other forms
were of the mixed type involving financial credits only as part of the
deal. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, one basic
difference between institutional and non-institutional markets is the
existence of different pricing mechanisms. Prices in the non-institutional
market were free to vary and always positive in real terms. As a con-
sequence quantities transacted were assumed, to be equilibrium ones.
It was also observed that pure financial transactions in the
non-institutional market were scarce, as may be observed by the number of
such transactions detected in the sample (16 out of 307 questionnaires,
and only half of them with declared race of interest).
Moneylenders, the type of lender involved in such transactions
were usually grocery store owners or established merchants who bought
and sold agricultural produce (cotton, corn, beans, coffee, etc). The
basic market characteristic of such financial transactions was the person-
to-person aspect of loan negotiation suggesting some form of monopolistic
price setting conditions and involving take-it-or-leave-it deals, in some
cases.
Finally, stagnant economic conditions as well as a certain
uniformity in economic and financial behavior characteristics were ob-
served, suggesting that an "average" farmer (borrower) and an average
lender could be idealized for analytical purposes, mainly in the lower
income groups. This typology regarding agents' homogeneity was tested
by introducing it into the model building process as such and, as will be
shown, generated specific individual demand and "supply" functions.
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Following this argument, the next step would consist of
specifying supply and demand functions, in which quantities offered and
demanded by this "average", individual, lender and borrower would be
explained by a set of variables representing transactor's behavior.
Given these functions, an additional assumption was made, -.e.,
- that transactions were only possible if lenders and borrowers agreed,
simultaneously, on the price to be paid and on the quantity to be trans-
acted, this meaning that observed transactions expressed in price and
quantity terms were equilibrium ones. At the mutually conventioned price
both parts agreed in borrowing and lending the specified amounts of
financial resources.
Regarding the specification of such functions, two alternative
demand function hypotheses were submitted to statistical analysis, based
on two distinct decision making characteristics. The first assuming that
farmers borrow resources in the non-institutional market after institutional
sources have been exausted, i.e., the amount of actual institutional
loans received determine the quantity to be demanded in the non-institution-
al market. The second outlook assumes that the decision of borrowing in
the non-institutional market is relatively independent of what farmers
may actually get from the institutional source, i.e., the demand of
resources in the non-institutional market is a function (besides other
variables) of an expected institutional loan. Beside these variables,
demand functions were also including price and the number of family
members belonging to farmer's household. Supply or transaction functions
were uniquely specified as depending on price and the yearly commercialized
value of production of the borrower.
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For the specification of the second demand function,. i.e.,
involving an uncertain amount of institutional loans, the first variable
included, price, represent real costs in terms of income forgone. The
higher its value the lower is the demand for loans supposed to be. Its
parameter sign is expected to be negative if the hypothesis is correc':.
The second variable, the expected institutional loan, should
reflect an intermarket effect on the demand of individual farmers. The
larger the expected institutional loan, the lower their demand for more
expensive non-institutional loans, expectation being the product of the
probability of access to the institutional market times the quantity
received once accepted by the system. Regression results should show a
negative sign for this variable if the hypothesis is correct. The use
of this variable assumes that farmers have some knowledge of who and,
approximately, how much a certain type of farmer receives from the in-
stitutional system in terms of loans. The significance of this variable
also reflects borrowers' alternatives in terms of financing sources or,
at least, his capability of getting cheap loans. As mentioned before,
small farmers are discriminated against having access to the institutional
system, this discrimination being tested in this model in terms of price
and quantity effects.
The third variable, family size, reflects the needs of farmers
in financing consumption during production periods when cash flows run
at negative levels if farm income schedules are concentrated in time or .
if alternative income generation opportunities outside the farm are not
available. The expected sign of this variable in the regression is
positive, i.e., the larger the family size, the larger the need for
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financial resources as well as the demand for loans. On the supply side
of the model, prices are again introduced for the same reason as before
but with the opposite meaning, i.e., prices reflect a gain in income, or
payment for an opportunity forgone by lending resources to farmers instead
of using them somewhere else. The expected sign of its parameter in the
regression is, therefore, positive, meaning that the larger the price or
payment, the larger the quantity of resources a lender is willing to
surrender, ceteris paribus.
The second variable included in the supply formulation is the
level of commercialized production by borrowers. This variable was
included because it seemed to be a better hedge against default than
assets given that non-institutional loans have no legal backing, like
institutional loans. A second reason to include this variable was that
lenders usually are product merchants and may be preferring borrowers who
may sell their produce to them at a later stage guaranteeing their supply
in this market. It should be emphasized that the type of relation is
different than the one observed among truckers and farmers. There is an
obligation of farmers to sell their produce to truckers while this is not
so with money lenders. The expected sign of this variable is positive
meaning that the larger its value, the more financial resources a lender
is willing to surrender, ceteris paribus. Formally, demand and supply
equations are written as follows:
DQ = a + b[R] + e[E] + d[F]
Q = e + f[R] + g[C]
QDS = Quantities demanded (D) and supplied (S), in Cr$1,000
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R = monthly rate of interest or price of loan
E = expected institutional loan = probability of institutional
acceptance X Quaitity of institutional loan
F = family size
C = log of commercialized p:oduction (in Cr$1,000)
As may be seen, interest rates (R) appear in both demand and
supply equations generating an identification problem if additional,
exogenous, variables are not included. Included, exogenous to the system,
variables are the expected value (E), family size (F) and commercialized
production (C).
Regarding the method of parameter estimation, two-stage least
squares were utilized, with a variant. Considering that from the 307
available farmer questionnaires only 16 reported moneylender transactions,
and from these, only 8 stated the rate of interest as well as quantities
transacted, the two-stage estimation method used the first 8 (with both,
quantity and price observations) cases in the interest rate parameter
estimation regression; afterwards all the 16 observations were used to
estimate the demand and supply functions substituting the observed rates
of interests by estimated ones.2
- Econometric Analysis of Non-Institutional Transactions
The following regression results were observed regarding the
first non-institutional model:
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Demand Function:
Q = 9.26 - 1.12[R] + .383F]- .738[E]
(2.24) (1.91) (1.66) (1.744)
Values in parenthesis are t statistics
Number of observations: 16
F statistic = 1.64
Supply Function:
Q = -3.94 + .319[R] + 2.13[C]
(.95) (1.39) (1.92)
Values in parenthesis are t statistics
Number of observations: 16
F statistic = 2.26
As may be seen in the demand regression, rates of interest got
a negative sign, as expected, and the variable is significant at the 95
percent confidence level.
The expected value of institutional loans (variable E) received
also a negative sign, as expected, and is significant at the 90 percent
confidence level.
Family size was positively signed, as expected, and significant
at the 90 percent confidence level.
F statistics were relatively low indicating that more was to
be explained.
Regarding the supply equation, prices were positively signed,
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as expected, and significant at the 95 percent confidence level. F
statistics were also low, the later improving when compared to demand
regression results.
The second experiment, regarding the certainty model, i.e.,
the demand for non-institutional loans being a function of prices, family
size and the actual loan received from institutional sources,.presented
the following regression results:
Demand Function:
Q = 3.74 - .527[R] + .437[F] - .067[DIC]
(2.39) (2.27) (1.88) (2.21)
Values in parentheses are t statisticZ
F statistic = 1.95
Variable DIC is the value of the institutional loan actually received,
while the other variables having the same meaning as in the first experi-
ment.
Supply Function:
SQ = -3.29 + .269[R] + 2.01[YPL]
(1.12) (1.86) (2.47)
Values in parentheses are t statistics
F statistic = 3.16
All variables have the same meaning as in the first experiment.
As may be seen, in the demand regression rates of interest are
negatively signed as expected and the variable is significant at the 97.5
percent level. Variable DIC (actual institutional loan) was also negatively
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signed as expected and significant at the 97.5 percent level. Family
size was positively signed as expected and significant at the 95 percent
level.
Regarding the supply equation, prices are positively signed as
expected and significant at the 95 percent level, while commercializeI
production is also positively signed as expected and significant at the
95 percent level. F statistics are low, but better than for the first
experiment.
Conclusions
Statistical results improved considerably when actual instead
of expected institutional loans were used to explain demand and sup;ly
behavior in the non-institutional market. This may be interpreted as
supporting the hypothesis that the non-institutional market gets the
marginal preference of borrowers and that transacted quantities are
marginal, as suggested in the first two chapters of this study.
These chapters have also indicated that small farmers are the
least contemplated by the institutional system, while the non-institutional
market is predominantly attending these farmers. When the reasons for
these results were examined on a person-to-person basis through a probab-
ilistic model, the institutional rationing procedures were found to be
explaining a good deal of the phenomena.
Consequently, the following question would refer to the
feasibility of extending credit to small farmers as a group and under
what conditions, given that potential benefits to borrowers are considerably
large as shown in the next chapter, and farmer economic performance may
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be improved with reflections on local economic and social conditions
in the study area.
Finally, Table 51 shows the 16 farmers included in the non-institu-
tional regression analysis and their characteristics. As may be seen, only
the first P had declared interest rates.
TABLE 51 - Observed Farmer Sample Points
Area Distance Commer. Institut. Non-Inst. Non-Inst.
Farmer of Prop. of
Number -(ha) Bank(Km)
Production Loan
Cr$1000 Cr$1000
Loan Rate of Family Educa-
Cr$1000 Interest Size tion
6
4
5
0
0
0
5 0 133
7 1 73
7 0 37
5 0 78
5 0 98
8 1 470
4 1 93
5 1 2''0
6 0 143
4 0 115
1 0 89
3 0 75
4 1 791.
Source: Serra do Baturity Sample, 1977
Value of
Assets
Cr$1000
Probab.
of Inst.
Loan
10
12
66
39
7
9
12
14
132
53
58
8
42
4
15
192
4
3
9
5
20
13
20
25
235
48
35
42
16
20
15
797
22
69
155
0
0
0
0
0
6
2
4
240
29
12
10
12
0
0
74
10
10,
4
5
6
5
4
4
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
.24
.06
.64
.66
.66
.40
.69
.53
, 99
,61
.83
.54
.42
.47
.37
1.00
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Footnotes for Chapter IV
1. Estimation and Inference in Nonlinear Structural Models; Berndt, E.K.,
Hall, B.H., Hall, R.E., and Hausman, J.A., Annals of Economic and
Social Measurement, 3/4, 1974
2. This method was also used by Hall, R., and by Kalachek and Raines
when dealing with a similar problem of missing observations. Hall's
reference is "Wages, Income and Hours of Work in the U.S. Labor Force."
Kalackek, E.D. and Raines, F.Q. in "Labor Supply of Income Workers and
Negative Income Tax," Technical Studies, Presidents Commission of
Income Maintenance Programs, Washington, D.C., 1970, pp. 159-185.
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CHAPTER V
COST - BENEFIT ANALYSES
As mentioned in Chapter III, individual credit demand functions,
at any point in time, incorporate all types of benefits and costs to
farmers of resource use alternatives, given existing credit conditions.
In the model regarding farmer behavior in the long-run (the
dynamic programming model) borrowing of resources was a complement to
available own resources, and prices of credit as well as returns from it
determined the amount to be demanded. In this study, borrowers' net
benefits are equivalent to their consumer surplus. Therefore, for .he
purpose of benefit calculations the concept of consumer surplus is crucial.
It is the difference of what a given borrower would be willing to pay for
an additional unit of resources and the price actually paid for that unit.
The difference comes from the fact that the price paid for all resource
units is equal to the price paid for the last (marginal) unit. Given that
an ordinary well-behaved demand function is declining from left to right,
i.e., unit prices fall the larger quantities are acquired (or borrowed),
the price paid for the last unit is always lower than for any previous
unit. The area under the demand schedule up to the price paid for the
given borrowed quantity, is the consumer surplus.
One peculiarity in this market is that borrowers may be paying
two different prices for a given borrowed quantity, i.e., they may be
borrowing in two credit markets (or sub-markets) simultaneously (the
institutional and non-institutional). Given that prices are different in
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each, their total benefits are composed of two distinct consumer surplus
regions under a same demand schedule.
A consequence of this peculiarity is that for the analytical
purpose of demand curve construction and interpretation, an a priori
assumption is made, i.e., borrowers will first be willing to borrow from
the institutional source and afterwards from the non-institutional one.
This may also be restated by saying that the marginal quantity borrowed
is always the non-institutional one, unless borrowers' requirements are
completely satisfied in the institutional market. If the farmer is
rationed by the institutional source at a quantity which is compatible
with an additional loan in the non-institutional market, he will be borrow-
ing in this second market as well.
Demand schedules, as seen, define where and how much to borrow,
given supply conditions. Figure 4 presents the above discussion in a
graphical version.
As may be seen, quantity Q is the amount borrowed in theI
institutional market at price P1 . Non-institutional market conditions
state that, given borrowers' characteristics, no quantity will be lent for
less than the price of P1 . This means that given the demand schedule and
the supply transaction conditions, quantity (Q2 ~ q1) will be borrowed in
the non-institutional market, at price P2. If non-institutional trans-
action conditions are such that the zero-quantity price is P3 or larger,
the borrower is only getting his resources in the institutional market.
On the other hand, he may be getting such large amounts in the institutional
market that there is no positive real price which would induce him to
transact in the non-institutional market. As may be seen in Figure J, the
P . institutional
P1
B'
non-institutional
QI Q2 Q
Figure 4
non-institutional part of the demand function or schedule, is extended to
the institutional part of the graph by a semi-hatched line D1D2D3 (in
Figure 2) representing the borrowers' full demand schedule. To represent
the same demand schedule on the same set of non-institutional axis, it is
projected over to the non-institutional part of the graph as shown in
Figure 51
To use the same form of equations in the price-quantity space
as estimated econometrically, the following algebraic derivation shows
how the total demand is derived from the non-institutional one.
Initially, non-institutional market equations are written:
D(1) QNI = a + gF + dQ1 + bPN (demand, non-institution)
S(2) QNI = a + yYPL + SPN (supply or transaction equation)
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institutional P
--- 4
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
non-institutional
QNI
Figure 5
DQNI
F=
P N
YPL
QI
S
= SNI = quantities demanded and supplied in the non-institutional market (individual)
number of family members
= non-institutional transaction price
= commercialized production of borrower
= quantity of institutional loan received by borrower
As shown graphically, total demand schedules are equal to the
sum of the institutional loan plus the non-institutional one, i.e.,
(3) Q'r= QNI + I 'NI T - I
Substituting Q by its equation,
*L- QI
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a + gF + dQ + bPN = QT I
QT= a + g? + . dQI + bPN +
QT= a + gF + (d + 1)Q1 + bPN
Making d + ... = c, we get:
(4) QT = a + gF + cQI + bPN, or
+ Q = a + gF + cQI + bPN
The same parameter values found in the non-institutional demand regression
analysis may be used for the total demand equation, with exception of the
Q 's one which must be added by one unit.
Regarding the calculation of the values of consumer surpluses
of individual farmers, they may be expressed as a sum total of geometrical
figures which compose the area under the demand schedule corresponding to
the consumer surplus.
Figure 6 shows the area (hatched) of total net benefits obtained
by the farmer when borrowing in both markets. For the quantity borrowed
in the institutional market, the area (consumer surplus) under the demand
curve up to the price paid for the given quantity Q is AP IBE, For the
quantity borrowed in the non-institutional market, the area (consumer
surplus) is equal to ECG. Total net benefits are equal to the area APIBE
plus area ECG, which is equal to area APIBCG.
The consumer surplus is composed of the following areas for
calculation purposes as shown in Figure 7:
- area A, corresponding to the area under the demand curve up
to the maximum price (P ) a farmer (borrower) is willing to pay
2~JA~j
9
hd
01
£ZT
128
for the borrowed quantity in the institutional market, QI,
i.e.,
(P3 - P I4)Q / 2
- area B, corresponding to the subsidy riped by the farmer when
borrowing in the institutional market at a price of PI. 'his
area is equal to:
(P4 
- P )QI
- area C, corresponding to the consumer surplus originated from
transacting in the non-institutional market the quantity
QT ~ ~ NI at a price of P5. This area is equal to:
(P4 - P 5 NI / 2
This model calculates the maximum possible benefits riped by a
borrower in both markets. It is an upper-bound because institutional
transaction costs are not included, i.e., only the rate of interest is
considered. The lower bound benefits would be corresponding to the area
A plus C if transaction costs plus the rate of interest are equal to P4 .
Policy Simulations
In the previous chapter, on econometric analysis, two alternative
non-institutional demand models were presented and tested, i.e., a certainty
model in which farmers knew what their status regarding the institutional
system was in terms of borrowing availabilities, afterwards adjusting
their demands in the non-institutional system; and an uncertainty model,
in which they do not know exactly what they were apt to in the institutional
system and be borrowing in the non-institutional system on the basis of
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an expected loan from the institutional one. Statistical results show
that the first hypothesis is more consistent with empirical observations
than the second, i.e., non-institutional demand is better explained by
the amount actually received by farmers from the institutional system than
by what they expect to receive. This is also consistent with the hypothesis
that the non-institutional demand is ane"adjustment" type of demand,
i.e., farmers first go to the institutional system and, depending on their
needs and resource availabilities, adjust in the non-institutional market
their remaining borrowing requirements.
For policy analysis purposes, the first question of interest
would refer to the type and amount of costs and benefits that a given
farmer generates when absorbed by the institutional credit system.
Alternatively, what amount of costs and benefits are generated when a
group of farmers have their attendance ratio in the institutional system,
expanded.
The first experiment would consist of analyzing a given farmer
which is not in the institutional system and would hypothetically be
absorbed by it. The prescribed amount to be lent would correspond to
the existing policy rationing system.
The second experiment would consist of a group analysis in which
an average farmer (representing this group) would have his probability of
acceptance increased, this meaning that more farmers in this group are
attended by the institutional system, while the quantity allocated to each
is reduced.
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Transferring a Farmer to the Institutional System
This exercise would basically consist of the following steps:
a) Select a non-institutional borrower from the existing sample.
b) Determine his demand schedule and equilibrium price-quantity
transaction combination.
c) Increase his institutional loan from zero to the institution-
ally prescribed amount, given his characteristics
d) Determine his new demand schedule as well as quantities
transacted in the non-institutional system.
e) Determine the net benefits and costs of transferring him to
the new position and compare these with the original ones.'
Referring to the first step, farmer number 3 of Table in the
previous chapter, was selected. This farmer has the following character-
istics:
- size of property: 66 hectares
- value of commercialized production in 1977; Cr$9,000
(YPL = 2.2)
- value of assets in 1977: Cr$155,000
- education level: 0 (not formally educated)
- family size: 5 members
- value of institutional loans received in 1977: nil
Given his individual characteristics, his demand equation in the
non-institutional market may be written, in a price-quantity space as:
D D(1) Q =5.93 - .527(P) P = 11.25 - 1.898(Q)
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Q = quantity borrowed
P = price of loan
Equation (1) is derived from the following estimated relation:
(2) QD = 3.74 - .527(P) + .437(F) - .067(DIC)
Equilibrium price-quantity combinations in the non-institutional
market may be calculated through the following system:
(3) P = 8.83 + .549(F) - .084(DIC) - 2.525(YPL)
(4) Q = -.915 + .148(F) - .0226(DIC) + 1.33(YPL)
Given farmer characteristics, the following equilibrium price-quantity
combination results:
- Quantity transacted in the non-institutional market before
the farmer is absorbed by the institutional system: Cr$2,747
- Price paid for non-institutional loan before being absorbed
by the institutional system: 6 percent a month.
If this farmer is absorbed by the institutional system, he will
be receiving an average loan of Cr$13,791, as predicted by equation (5).
See Chapter IV for details.
(5) LogQ = -1.253 + .642(log assets) + .39(education)
+ .667 (owner)
As absorbed by the institutional system, the farmer would be adjusting
his actual demand (equation 1, above) in the non-institutional market
according to what he gets in the institutional one, and be shifting his
schedule as predicted by equation (2). This revision generates the
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following, new, non-institutional demand schedule:
(6) = 5. - .527(P) P = 9.49 - 1.898(QNI
Given that his chapacteristics have not changed, the non-institutional
transaction schedule would not be shifting and the new equilibrium price-
quantity combination becomes:
QjN = Cr$2,435 PNI = 4.87 percent a month
His total demand schedule (equation 7, below) shifts from the non-institu-
tional position to an independent one given that he is receiving an
institutional loan of Cr$13,791.
(7) QT = a + g(F) + c(QI) + b(P), for c = d + 1= -.067 + 1
= .933
QT = 18.97 - .527(P) P = 35.65 - 1.898(Q )
The shifting of partial and total demand schedules may be graphically
visualized as follows (See Figures 5 and 6).
Figure 8 presents the original, non-institutional equilibrium
combination before the farmer is absorbed by the institutional system.
Demand schedule D and supply transaction schedule T determine the non-
1 1institutional price-quantity combination (PNI' NI). As the farmer is
absorbed by the institutional system there will be a backward shift in
his non-institutional demand schedule represented by the new D curve, as
shown in Figure 8A, This shift reduced the equilibrium quantity and price
2 2
combinations in this market to PNI' q. The reduction comes from the
fact that the farmer (borrower) has now access to the institutional
market, substituting institutional for non-institutional quantities.
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The downward movement of the non-institutional demand schedule
reflects a substitution and an income effect, and the upward movement of
the total demand schedule a wealth effect.
Figure 8A shows only a total price effect, which includes a
substitution and an income effect in the non-institutional schedule, and
the wealth effect is perceived by the shift of the total demand schedule
D to the D position.
Benefits may now be calculated as discussed before.
- Area A benefits:
(P3 - P4)QI / 2 = Cr$641.3 / month
P4 = 9.49 (from equation 6)
P3 = 18.79 (from equation 7)
Q = 13.791 (from equation 5)
- Area B benefits:
(P4 - P1 )Q = Cr$1,157.1 / month
P, = 1.1 (as defined by the institutional system - rate of
interest)
- Area C benefits:
(P4 - P5 QNI / 2 = Cr$56.25 / month
P5 = 4.87 (from equations 3 and 4)
The shifting of this farmer to the institutional system generates a total
net benefit of Cr$1,854.7 / month.
Financial revenue losses of the institutional system from borrowing
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resources at subsidized rates correspond to the price difference of
commercial to subsized rural loans times the quantity lent, which is equal
to Cr$262.03 / month. As mentioned before, administrative costs are not
included in this total. The difference of farmers' benefits to institu-
tional systiem's losses is Cr$1,592.67, per month.
Considering that the average lending period of production loans
is 10 months, this generates a total net gain of Cr$15,926.7, which is
larger than the amount lent by 15.5 percent and is equivalent to the
average opportunity cost of capital in the economy.
The difference of net benefits generated by borrowing, to the
farmer, from the new to the original position is equivalent to the new
and old consumer surpluses plus the subsidy, corresponding to Cr$1,782.6
per month, or 96 percent of the gain.
As may be seen, net benefits to recipients are considerable if
transaction costs are exclusively composed of the rate of interest.
Considering that the difference of benefits to the borrower and revenue
losses to the lender are also large when administrative expenses are
excluded, it becomes obvious that credit distribution costs should be
as small as possible, for lending programs to be worthwhile. The larger
these transaction costs are, the larger the minimum loan per farmer must
be to compensate for these costs. Expensive distribution systems tend
to concentrate resources in the hands of few.
The second experiment consists of a group analysis in which the
group attendance by the institutional system increases but total lending
funds remaing constant. The purpose is to examine to what extent welfare
results are improved by a larger attendance and lower resource concentration.
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For this, the following steps are undertaken:
a) selection of a group of farmers
b) determination of average characteristics and demand schedules,
total and non-institutional
c) increase of institutional attendance, to all members of the
group and decrease of the amount of loans received by attended
farmers
d) determination of new demand schedules
e) comparison of old and new positions
The first step is to select a group of farmers. This is the sampled 0 -
10 hectares one, whose characteristics are presented in Chapter II, Tables
1, 2 and 4. These characteristics may be summarized as follows:
- value of average yearly commercialized production: Cr$12,603
- average family size: 6.17 members
- average institutional loan: Cr$7,400
- number of farmers attended by institutional system: 10,
- total number of farmers belonging to group: 63
The average individual non-institutional demand schedule, given groups'
characteristics may be written as:
D D
(8) Q = 5.94 - .527(P) P = 11.27 - 1.898Q
for those with institutional loans; and
(9) Q = 6.44 - .527(P) P = 12.22 - 1 .8 9 8 QD
for those without institutional loans.
The total demand schedule for those with institutional loans
differ from their non-institutional one, and may be written as:
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(10) QT = 13.34 - .527(P) P = 25.31 - 1 .8 9 8QT
Demand schedules for those without institutional loans are the same as
the non-institutional ones. Benefits and losses may be calculated as
before.
- Area C benefits, for those without institutional loans are:
(P4 - P 5)NI / 2 = Cr$214.40 / month
P = 12.22 (from equation 8)
P5 = 5.84 (from equation 9)
QNI = 3.36 (from equation 4)
- Area A benefits for those with institutional loans are:
(P3 - P4)QI / 2 = Cr$76.60 / month
P = 11.27 (from equation 8)
P3 = 13.34 (from equation 10)
Q = 7.4 (as defined by the sample)
- Area B benefits, for those with institutional credit, are:
(P4 - P1 )Q1  = Cr$752.58 / month
- Area C benefits for those with institutional credit are:
(P4 - P5)QNI / 2 = Cr$193 / month
P = 11.27 (from equation 8)
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P = 5.22 (from equation 8)
QNI = 3.319 (from equation 4)
Total net benefits for the group: Cr$21,583.2/month, decompose as follows:
-53 x Cr$214.4 = 11,363.2 (for non-institutional lenders)
-10 x Cr$1022.0 = 10,220 (for institutional lenders)
Revenue losses of institutional system: Cr$1,406 / month
The second part of the experiment consist of extending individual
institutional loans to all farmers in the group without increasing the
total amount to be allocated for the group, what gives a per-capita loan
of Cr$1,175. Here it is assumed that no farmer had any institution. credit
before. The demand schedule in the non-institutional market becomes:
(11) QD = 6.36 - .527(P) P = 12.07 - 1.898(Q D)
The total demand schedule in both markets is:
(12) QT = 7.53 - .527(P) P = 14.29 - 1.898(Q)
Area A benefits, per farmer, will be:
(P3 - P 4 )QI / 2 =
P3 = 14.29
P = 12.07
Cr$13.04 / month
(from equation 12)
(from equation 11)
Q= 1.175
Area B benefits, per farmer, will be:
( - PI)Q = Cr$128.9/month
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Area C benefits, per farmer, will be:
(P4 - P5 QNI / 2 = Cr$211.17 / month
P5 = 5.74 (from equation 11)
QNI = 3.336 (from equation 4)
Total monthly net benefits for group: Cr$22,246, which is composed of
63 x Cr$353.ll, i.e., the total number of farmers times the individual
benefits type A, B and C received by each.
As may be seen, gains are larger for the group if all are
attended with small amounts of credit. But given that transaction costs
are excluded the result is probably worse than if some concentration
exists or if total amounts borrowed are expanded, given that transaction
costs, excluded from the rates of interests, are fixed.
The main conclusion is that small farmer credit programs are only
feasible when the distribution of loans is relatively inexpensive and
amounts to be allocated reasonable. This argument reinforces the con-
clusions reached by the first experiment.
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CONCLUSIONS
As mentioned in the introduction to this study, the rural credit
market in the Northeast of Brazil may be divided into an institutional,
or formal, sub-market and a non-institutional, or informal, one.
As shown in Chapters I and II, the non-institutional sub-market
handles that part of the demand for loans which is not attended by the
institutional market, chiefly the unsatisfied demand of institutional
borrowers plus the great smajority of smaller farmers which were not
attended by the formal system at all.
Econometric analyses showed tha.t the hypothesis regarding the
role played by the non-institutional sub-market was sustained, i.e., that
non-institutional quantities and prices are marginal, indicating that
farmers' shadow-prices were these non-institutional prices.
The same analysis also indicated that there are intermarket effects,
i.e., that the institutional rationing process affects the behavior of
borrowers in the non-institutional market.
Therefore, it may be said that given intermarket effects, the
institutional borrowing mechanism affects farmer shadow prices and the
decision making process of how to allocate their resources.
By estimating individual demand schedules, one outcome was that
subsidized credit generates substantive income transferences to institu-
tional loan receivers, while small price-effects, indicating that there
is little incentive to expand production per se, unless other types of
incentives are given, or exist, at the time.
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A second aspect mentioned in the introduction to this study was
the methodological as well as policy error commonly made regarding
rural credit programs implemented by the government. These programs are,
usually, justified solely by the amounts of benefits generated by
increased agricultural production. A consequence is to allocate resources
primarily to those farmers which are believed to generate the largest
agricultural surpluses.
This study shows that this miopic view of credit programs' outcomes
is doomed to failure because farmers are also consumers and may be
willing to invest their resources outside the sector as well, unless
specific incentives are devised to avoid these drains.
Given that income effects are Lonsiderably larger than price effects,
benefits from institutional credit should not be accounted for by in-
creased production as such, but mainly by increased consumption and
income redistribution.
In Brazil, financial resources are heavily concentrated on larger
farmers, while migration and underemployment in the sector are a broadly
observed phenomenon. This miopic view seems, again, to foreclose broader
policy outcomes of such programs, mainly in the Northeast of the country.
In this study, benefits were, methodologically, derived from
individual farmer demand curves. As shown in Chapter V, total farmer
benefits are larger when resources are spread over a number of farmers,
instead of concentrated. It was also shown that the feasibility of entire
programs depended basically on processing costs, i.e., on loan distribution
costs. The larger these costs, the greater the concentration of credit
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ought to be for making any specific program feasible. Therefore, for
credit programs to be deconcentrated, relatively inexpensive distributive
systems ought to be devised.
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